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INTRODUCTION
“I [was] . . . the equal of the gods, save only [t]hat I must die.”
–Euripides1

Federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”) understand
Euripides’s irony all too well.2 They, along with Article I judges, are
the demigods of federal adjudication. As both courts and ALJs have
noted, the function of ALJs closely parallels that of Article III judges.3

1.
EURIPIDES, HECUBA 33 (tran. line 341–44) (John Harrison ed. & trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2008) (quoting Princess Polyxena’s speech, delivered before she is sacrificed).
2.
ALJs have successfully lobbied for more prestigious titles, evolving from mere
“examiners,” to “hearing examiners,” to “administrative law judges.” Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal
Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110 n.8
(1981); see also K.G. Jan Pillai, Rethinking Judicial Immunity for the Twenty-First Century, 39
HOW. L.J. 95, 123 (1995):
Naturally, the ALJs would like to think of themselves as judges or the functional
equivalent of federal judges. In 1972, they persuaded the Civil Service Commission
(now the OPM) to change their title from ‘hearing examiner’ to ‘administrative law
judge’ for the purpose of enhancing their public image and prestige.
Yet, they are commonly referred to as ALJs, a designation that arguably diminishes their
judicial status. They are not amused. See Lubbers, supra, at 109 n.1 (citing the August 1979
Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference newsletter); see also James P. Timony,
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law Judges, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
807, 814–15 (1984) (relaying how Third Circuit Judge Aldisert “noted” and dismissed “the past
prejudice of some Article III federal judges, scholarly critics and attorneys who believe[d] that
administrative law judges were second-class judges (if judges at all)” (citing NLRB v. Permanent
Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 527–28 (3d Cir. 1981) (Aldisert, J., concurring))). Like Professor
Lubbers, I use the ubiquitous acronym only for brevity.
3.
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978):
[P]roceedings [before an ALJ] are adversary in nature. . . . They are conducted before
a trier of fact insulated from political influence. . . . A party is entitled to present his
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ALJs hear evidence, decide factual issues, and apply legal principles
in all formal administrative adjudications under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”).4 Indeed, they outnumber Article III judges5
and decide more than two hundred and fifty thousand cases each
year.6 But they lack the defining characteristics of Article III deities.
Article III judges are installed under the Appointments Clause,7 enjoy
tenure and salary protection during times of “good Behavior,”8 and are
not generally subject to reversal by the executive branch.9 In contrast,
ALJs are hired as mere employees by executive officials, receive more
limited salary protection than Article III judges, and are subject to
removal within the executive branch.10 Moreover, the agencies for
which ALJs work—often themselves parties to the proceedings—can
reverse ALJs’ decisions in toto.11 In Euripidean parlance, ALJs are
equal to Article III judges, except for the Article III part.

case by oral or documentary evidence . . . and the transcript of testimony and exhibits
together with the pleadings constitute the exclusive record for decision.
(citations omitted); Robin J. Artz et al., Advancing the Judicial Independence and Efficiency of
the Administrative Judiciary: A Report to the President-Elect of the United States, 29 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 93, 95 (2009) (“ALJs are the functional equivalent of federal trial
judges.”).
4.
5 U.S.C. §§ 553–54, 556–57 (2006) (detailing requirements for formal administrative
rulemaking and adjudication). Although ALJs can also preside in formal rulemaking
proceedings, id. §§ 553(c), 556–57, formal rulemaking is extremely rare, see Edward Rubin, It’s
Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107
(2003) (“Because the impracticalities of formal rulemaking are well known, Congress rarely
requires this technique, and courts avoid interpreting statutes to require it, even in the rare
cases where the statute seems to do so.”). This Article concerns only ALJs’ duties in formal
adjudications.
5.
Compare Judges and Judgeships, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/
JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited Jan. 14, 2013) (listing 874 total
Article III judgeships), with Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180–81 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Federal Government relies on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate
administrative matters in over 25 agencies.”).
6.
See Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA
L. REV. 1341, 1346 n.18 (1992) (stating that ALJs decided more than two hundred and fifty
thousand social security cases in 1990).
7.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
8.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9.
Federal agencies can reverse judicial statutory interpretations under certain
circumstances. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
983–84 (2005) (permitting agencies to provide authoritative interpretations of ambiguous
statutory language even after a contrary judicial interpretation).
10. See generally infra Part I.
11. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006) (“On appeal from or review of the [ALJ’s] initial decision,
the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may
limit the issues on notice or by rule.”).
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The Structural Quandary
These differences between ALJs and Article III judges do more
than chisel a chip on ALJs’ shoulders. They reveal material practical
and constitutional tensions, if not constitutional violations, that the
U.S. Supreme Court has recently revitalized. These tensions concern
ALJs’ appointments, the President’s supervisory powers over ALJs,
and ALJs’ independence and impartiality. These three concerns are in
tension, rendering their resolution difficult.
First. If, as five current Supreme Court Justices have now
suggested,12 ALJs are “inferior Officers” (not mere employees), the
manner in which some are currently selected is likely
unconstitutional.13 The Appointments Clause in Article II of the U.S.
Constitution requires that such officers be appointed in one of four
ways: by (1) the President with the Senate’s consent, (2) the President
alone, (3) the courts of law, or (4) heads of departments.14 ALJs,
however, are selected by heads of agencies, only some of whom qualify
as heads of departments.
Second. ALJs’ job (or tenure) protections may improperly limit
the President’s implied power to remove and supervise executivebranch officers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution.15 The
agencies that select ALJs can remove them only for “good cause” and
only with the consent of an independent federal agency, the Merit
Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), whose members the President
can remove only for enumerated reasons. A recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, invalidated the use of
“tiered” tenure protection (i.e., two layers of tenure protection between
the President and the officer at issue) for inferior officers.16 The four

12. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180–81 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ.) (asking whether the majority’s
holding that dual for-cause insulation is unconstitutional would affect ALJs, who might be
considered “Officers”); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 910 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, joined by O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (“[ALJs] are all
executive officers.” (emphasis omitted)).
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Act before us
imposes a new type of restriction—two levels of protection from removal for those who
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dissenting Justices in that decision noted that ALJs’ two tiers of
tenure protection (one for ALJs and one for the MSPB) would also
appear to limit the President’s supervisory power improperly.17 In
short, the Court’s most recent foray into this area suggests that the
removal regime for ALJs clashes with the President’s executive
authority.18
Third. At the same time, increasing presidential control over
ALJs would create impartiality concerns under the Due Process
Clause. Agencies are parties to proceedings before the same ALJs that
they appoint and that they may remove for good cause (albeit subject
to the MSPB’s consent).19 If ALJs lose one of their two tiers of tenure
protection, either (1) agencies will be able to remove ALJs at will (and
thus render the MSPB’s extant tenure protection and role
meaningless) or (2) agencies will be able to remove ALJs for cause
with the consent of the MSPB, whose members the President can
remove at will. The Supreme Court has strongly indicated that,
despite some contrary scholarly opinions, the current ALJ model is
sufficient under the Due Process Clause. But its recent decision
concerning recusal of elected state-court judges, Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co.,20 casts doubt on this view. The agencies’ ability to
appoint ALJs and initiate their removal creates obvious incentives for
ALJs to favor agency positions. Regardless of whether this partiality
problem assumes an unconstitutional dimension, the current
structure raises problems for ALJs, agencies, parties that appear
before ALJs, and society as a whole.
Existing proposals to reform the ALJ system fail to identify,
much less solve, these competing concerns.21 For instance, simply
permitting a department head (perhaps of a new independent agency)
to appoint ALJs would resolve the appointment issue, but not fully
address due process or presidential-supervision concerns. Likewise,
providing ALJs increased tenure protection may resolve lingering
independence concerns, but leave the President with insufficient
supervisory power over ALJs, while not addressing the appointment
issue at all. Conversely, reducing ALJ tenure protection may resolve
nonetheless exercise significant executive power. Congress cannot limit the President’s authority
in this way.”).
17. See id. at 3181 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Does every losing party before an ALJ now
have grounds to appeal on the basis that the decision entered against him is unconstitutional?”).
18. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
19. See infra Part II.C.
20. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
21. See infra Part III.
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presidential-supervision concerns, but damage ALJ independence and,
once again, fail to address Appointments Clause concerns.

The Solution
My proposed remedy is to permit the D.C. Circuit to appoint,
discipline, and remove ALJs upon request from administrative
agencies.22 Permitting a “Court[] of Law” to appoint ALJs, who are at
most “inferior Officers” within the executive branch, comports with
the text of the Appointments Clause and Supreme Court case law.23
To be sure, the Court has prohibited Congress from creating
“incongruous” interbranch appointments.24 Although the Court’s
existing approach to incongruity is murky, I extract from it a threepart inquiry that unifies the incongruity principle with the separationof-powers constraints that the Court has erected in this field. In short,
courts should deem an interbranch appointment appropriate when
(1) Congress has a significant justification for turning to its
interbranch-appointment power, (2) the power to appoint (and an
incidental power to remove) does not impede the appointing branch’s
central functioning under the U.S. Constitution, and (3) the lack of
appointment (and removal) power does not, likewise, impede the
competing branch’s central functioning.
The D.C. Circuit’s appointment of ALJs satisfies these three
criteria. First, it is significantly justified because it resolves the three
constitutional concerns. It does so by properly placing the
appointment power in a “court of law”; ending “tiered” removal
protection within the executive branch for ALJs by appropriately
giving the D.C. Circuit the power to remove ALJs, as consistent with
existing interbranch-appointment doctrine and even the underlying
rationale of Free Enterprise Fund; and limiting the executive branch’s
role in appointing and removing the adjudicators for formal
proceedings to which executive agencies are often parties. Second, the
22. See infra Part IV.A.
23. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by law vest the Appointment of such
inferior Officers, as they think proper . . . in the Courts of Law . . . .”).
24. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675 (1988):
We do not mean to say that Congress’ power to provide for interbranch appointments
of ‘inferior officers’ is unlimited. In addition to separation of powers concerns . . .
Congress’ decision to vest the appointment power in the courts would be improper if
there was some ‘incongruity’ between the functions normally performed by the courts
and the performance of their duty to appoint.
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interbranch appointment does not impede the central functioning of
the D.C. Circuit. As the court that hears numerous administrative law
cases and has the lowest judge-to-merits-decisions ratio among the
circuit courts, the D.C. Circuit has the expertise and time to appoint
and remove other adjudicators. Indeed, Article III courts currently
perform the interbranch appointment and removal of Article I
bankruptcy judges, as well as the intrabranch appointment and
removal of magistrate judges and special masters. Third, the
interbranch appointment does not impede the central functioning of
the executive branch. The executive branch may still formulate all
administrative policy that arises from formal adjudication by
continuing to reverse ALJ decisions in toto under the APA.
Ultimately, this Article seeks to do three things. It seeks to
identify the three competing concerns surrounding ALJs, suggest a
workable statutory solution to a major problem in administrative law
that recent Supreme Court decisions have brought into focus, and
clarify the nature and benefits of Congress’s interbranch-appointment
power for the federal administrative state. To those ends, Part I
provides a brief synopsis of current ALJ hiring, removal, and
independence protections. Part II considers the constitutional
questions surrounding ALJs’ selection, removal, and independence to
bring the tripartite quandary into clear view. Part III considers the
limitations on prior solutions and scholarship in light of the quandary,
most of which focus only on ALJ independence. And finally, Part IV
provides a refined manner of analyzing the propriety of interbranch
appointments and argues that an interbranch appointment of ALJs
resolves the quandary. Even with a permissible interbranch
appointment, ALJs certainly won’t be gods. But a limited ALJ
apotheosis, brought about by an interbranch appointment, should
mitigate concerns that surround ALJs’ place within our government of
separated powers.
I. ALJS’ CURRENT SELECTION, REMOVAL, AND PROTECTIONS
A brief exposition of the current manner of ALJ selection,
removal, and independence permits a better understanding of the
theoretical and doctrinal concerns mentioned above. An interbranchappointment remedy, as explained later, can adopt much of the
current ALJ appointment and removal structure by reallocating
various powers to effect the desired structural improvement.
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A. Current ALJ Selection
The appointment of ALJs, unlike that of Article III judges, does
not require the President’s nomination and the Senate’s
confirmation.25 Instead, each federal agency selects ALJs “as are
necessary” for the agency to conduct formal adjudicatory
proceedings.26 The President is not directly, if at all, involved in the
selection of ALJs, and the Senate does not serve as a check on the
agency’s choice.
But agencies do not have carte blanche when selecting ALJs.
Instead, the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) creates and
administers standards for ALJ selection for the approximately sixteen
hundred federal ALJs.27 Candidates must be licensed attorneys with
at least seven years’ experience and pass an examination that tests
their ability to draft a decision and analyze relevant legal issues.28
Military veterans receive five to ten preference points.29 Based on
their experiences, examination scores, and veteran statuses, the
highest-scoring candidates are placed on a list.30 Agencies, under what

25. See Harold Levinson, The Status of the Administrative Judge, 38 AM. J. COMP. L.
(SUPP.) 523, 532–33 (1990) (contrasting the Article III appointment process with ALJ selection).
26. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006).
27. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180–81 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (“My research reflects that the Federal Government relies on 1,584 ALJs to
adjudicate administrative matters in over 25 agencies.”); Levinson, supra note 25, at 533.
28. VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2010); Jesse Etelson, The New ALJ Examination: A Bright, Shining
Lie Redux, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 185, 191–93 (1991) (explaining and critiquing the ALJ written
examination that requires candidates to draft a hypothetical opinion).
29. Veterans’ Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3309; 5 C.F.R. § 302.201 (2012). The OPM’s scoring
formulation for veterans led to protracted litigation and even temporary suspension of hiring
ALJs from 1999 to 2003. BURROWS, supra note 28, at 3:
The litigation arose out of changes that OPM made in 1996 to the scoring formula
that is used to rate and rank potential ALJs. These changes . . . resulted in a scoring
system that . . . [gave] veterans a significant hiring advantage over non-veterans. As a
consequence, non-veteran applicants for ALJ positions sued, claiming that the new
scoring formula was unlawful.
See also Meeker v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 319 F.3d 1368, 1369–72 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (describing the
litigation’s journey to the Federal Circuit). ALJs and agencies have criticized the veterans’
preference because an additional ten points based on veteran status can have a significant effect
on the final list of candidates, whose scores range from eighty to one hundred points. See
Lubbers, supra note 2, at 115–16 (“Since there is only a 20-point spread on scores among all ALJ
eligibles (from 80 to 100), the addition of 5 to 10 veterans preference points to any score can
change by many places an eligible’s ranking on the register.”).
30. See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 2 (“Applicants who meet the[ ] minimum qualification
standards and pass the examination are then assigned a score and placed on a register of eligible
hires.”).
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is known as the “Rule of Three,”31 may then select from the three
highest-ranking candidates.32
Agencies, perhaps unsurprisingly, have sought to avoid the
Rule of Three. They have instead sought “selective certification.”33
Selective certification permits an agency, “upon a showing of necessity
and with the prior approval of OPM, . . . to appoint specially certified
eligibles without regard to their ranking in relation to other
eligibles . . . who lack the special certification.”34 Numerous agencies
routinely engaged in selective certification from the 1960s until the
early 1980s, generally justified by needing ALJs with technical
knowledge and experience.35 Yet after substantial criticism that
selective certification allowed agencies to hire ALJs with a more “proenforcement attitude,”36 the OPM ended selective certification in
1984.37 Much to ALJs’ alarm,38 certain agencies have recently sought
to obtain waivers from the OPM to engage in selective certification
once again39 and even appealed to Congress for legislative
dispensation from the OPM’s refusal.40

31. Artz et al., supra note 3, at 101.
32. See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 2–3 (“Agencies then select an ALJ from the top three
available candidates, taking into account the location of the position, the geographical preference
of the candidate, and veterans’ preference rules.”).
33. Lubbers, supra note 2, at 117.
34. Id.
35. See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 101; see also BURROWS, supra note 28, at 5–6
(overviewing the history of selective certification from before the APA’s enactment through the
1980s).
36. Lubbers, supra note 2, at 118.
37. See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 6 (“In 1984, OPM ended the selective certification
procedure in Examination Announcement No. 318. Agencies were no longer allowed to formally
require subject-matter expertise.”); see also 5 C.F.R. § 332.404 (2012) (requiring agency to select
from the “highest three eligibles”).
38. See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 98, 101–02 (“We urge [the President-Elect] to appoint
agency heads who will respect, uphold, and enforce the provisions of the APA regarding the
federal agency administrative adjudication process. In recent years, agency heads have been
making legislative efforts to erode . . . the APA provisions that ensure the independence of ALJ
decision-making.”).
39. See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 6 (noting that the International Trade Commission
(“ITC”) and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) have sought selective-certification
powers).
40. Artz et al., supra note 3, at 101–02 (noting that the ITC and the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) both sought legislation to permit them to evade the OPM’s refusal to permit
selective certification). But see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-14, RESULTSORIENTED CULTURES: OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SHOULD REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE PROGRAM TO IMPROVE HIRING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 8–10 (2010)
[hereinafter GAO-10-14] (reporting that the SSA and Health and Human Services officials were
pleased with the quality of ALJ candidates, although they sought changes—such as by awarding
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Despite the OPM’s rejection of selective certification, ALJs are
dissatisfied with the OPM. In a 2008 report to President-elect Obama,
the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference argued that the
OPM should be divested of its authority to appoint and review ALJs.41
The ALJs complained that the OPM eliminated the office that selected
ALJs (by assigning that office’s duties to other offices within the
OPM), eliminated the requirement for ALJ candidates to have
litigation experience,42 altered the ALJ-exam schedule in a manner
that rendered it “difficult for private sector attorneys to apply,”43 and
sought to reward ALJs based on an agency’s political goals.44
Ultimately, the ALJs reported that “the OPM . . . has sought to
undermine ALJs[’] independence and downgrade ALJs’ level of
experience and competence.”45 Partially in response to ALJs’ concerns,
the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) has recently
recommended certain changes to Congress concerning ALJ hiring and
supervision.46
B. Current ALJ Tenure Protections and Independence
Once selected, ALJs have certain protections from political
forces but limited independence in making final decisions. The APA
provides for a separation of functions between ALJs and certain
agency employees. ALJs may not perform investigative or
prosecutorial functions or report to an employee who does, or have ex
parte contacts concerning a fact at issue.47 But heads of agencies can

bonus points to eligible candidates—to ensure that the appointment considered “specialized
knowledge”).
41. See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 106 (“[W]e advocate the creation of a new independent
agency . . . which would be responsible for the functions that the OPM has been performing, or
should have been performing . . . .”).
42. Id. at 105–06.
43. Id. at 106.
44. See id. at 105 (“[T]he OPM has taken the position that ALJs are no different from other
federal employees and should be covered by a ‘pay for performance’ system that measures
performance by agency (i.e., political) goals. If implemented, OPM’s position would result in
inappropriate agency influence over the functions performed by ALJs . . . .”).
45. Id. at 106.
46. See GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 26–28 (suggesting, among other things, that ALJs
become more involved in hiring and personnel-management decisions).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1)–(2) (2006). Nevertheless, the ALJ may remain responsible to the
head of the agency, although the head of the agency also oversees investigations and
prosecutions. See id. § 554(d)(2)(C); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized Courts in Administrative Law,
43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 346 (1991) (describing separation of powers for ALJs).
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still set agency policy and supervise ALJs.48 They have the authority
to reverse ALJs’ decisions in full, as to both fact and law.49 Agencies,
however, must provide some deference to ALJs’ witness-demeanor
observations50 and consider the ALJs’ initial decision during
administrative appeal.51
If unsatisfied with their power to reverse ALJ decisions,
agencies have a circumscribed ability to discipline and remove ALJs.
Agencies may remove and generally discipline ALJs only for “good
cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection
Board” after a formal administrative hearing.52 The MSPB members,
like ALJs, also enjoy tenure protection because the President can
remove them “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in
office.”53 Otherwise, ALJs essentially have life tenure because they do
not serve for a period of years in office.54
ALJs’ effective life tenure, however, loses some of its sheen
because of the ambiguity of the good cause standard that governs
MSPB proceedings.55 That standard has permitted removal for, among
other things, being absent for extended periods, declining to set
hearing dates, and having a “high rate of significant adjudicatory
errors.”56 Moreover, the MSPB has indicated that insubordination can
constitute cause, although the Board left unclear how specific the
48. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)(C) (exempting the “agency or a member or members of the body
comprising the agency” from the separation-of-functions requirement).
49. See id. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the
powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the issues on
notice or by rule.”); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 494–95 (1951) (explaining
that the APA permits agencies to decline adopting an ALJ’s recommendations).
50. Timony, supra note 2, at 811 (citing Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 496; E. Eng’g &
Elevator Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1980)).
51. Id. at 811–12 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1982)).
52. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
53. Id. § 1202(d).
54. See Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1344. Professor Verkuil argues that ALJs have more
secure tenure than bankruptcy and magistrate judges because ALJs are not appointed to terms
of office. See id. Although ALJs do not have to worry about an essentially standardless judicial
reappointment, cf. Tuan Samahon, Are Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments
Clause Challenge, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 248 (2008) (“During 1998 to 2002, circuit courts
reappointed over 90% of those bankruptcy judges applying for reappointment.”), they can be
removed under what appears to be a more liberal tenure-protection provision by another
executive entity. See infra notes 55–62 and accompanying text.
55. Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321, 325 (1984); Harold J. Krent & Lindsay
DuVall, Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence with Institutional Interests of the
Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 34 (2005) (“[T]he meaning of
‘cause’ is unclear . . . .”).
56. BURROWS, supra note 28, at 8 (quoting A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION
172 (Michael Asimov ed., 2003)).
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agency’s instructions and how overwhelming the agency’s evidence of
insubordination must be.57
In light of the uncertain governing removal standard, perhaps
it is not surprising that more removal proceedings have been brought
against ALJs than against Article III judges. Article III judges retain
their appointments “during good Behavior”—a more demanding
standard than good cause—and are removed only after the
cumbersome interbranch-collaborative process of impeachment.58 Only
fifteen Article III judges have been impeached in more than two
hundred years.59 In contrast, agencies have brought more than twenty
actions against ALJs from 1946 to 1992.60 ALJs have noted these
removal attempts—especially the fifteen of which occurred over a sixyear period in the 1970s and 1980s61—and the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) Commissioner’s recent legislative proposal to
obtain authority to “discipline” ALJs for undefined “offenses” without
prior findings by the MSPB.62

57. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 326, 331; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control
Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons from Chevron and Mistretta, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 506 (1990) (criticizing MSPB’s insubordination dicta and its “abysmal
ignorance of statistics” in appearing to reject the Agency’s productivity argument). The MSPB,
earlier in its opinion, stated, “If the agency is basing its charge on reasons which constitute an
improper interference with the performance by an ALJ of his or her judicial functions, the charge
cannot constitute good cause.” Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 328.
58. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 326 (citing
McEachern v. Macy, 341 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1965)) (holding that good cause standard has been
more broadly interpreted than good-behavior standard); Benton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1017
(Ct. Cl. 1973); and Chocallo v. Prokop, C.A. No. 80–1053 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 1980), aff’d mem., 673
F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
59. Impeachments of Federal Judges, FED. JUD. CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.
nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html (last visited May 16, 2011). Three of the impeached judges
resigned before the Senate’s impeachment trials concluded. See id.
60. BURROWS, supra note 28, at 9; James E. Moliterno, The Administrative Judiciary’s
Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1222 n.150 (2006) (citing Morell E. Mullins,
Manual for Administrative Law Judges, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES i, 116 (2004)).
Social Security Commissioner Michael Astrue stated that fifty-eight ALJs have been disciplined
since 2007, mostly for deciding too few cases. See David Ingram, Social Security’s Disability
Judges Come Under Scrutiny, THE BLT: BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (July 11, 2011, 5:14 PM),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/07/social-securitys-disability-judges-come-underscrutiny.html. But one ALJ was placed on administrative leave based on his high approval of
disability benefits. See id.
61. Bruff, supra note 47, at 348 (noting, in 1991, the “recent, sharp upturn in the frequency
of [ALJ] removal attempts”); Timony, supra note 2, at 807 & n.2 (listing cases).
62. Artz et al., supra note 3, at 103–04.
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II. PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOMFORT
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions either create or
reenergize three significant issues surrounding ALJs’ current
selection and removal. First, does the method of ALJs’ selection violate
the Appointments Clause? Second, do ALJs’ tenure protections
improperly impede the President’s supervisory powers? Finally, do
ALJs’ current tenure protections (or reduced protections, if required
under Article II) create due process and fairness concerns? Scholars
have typically limited themselves to addressing the appropriate
balance between ALJ independence and subordination, but without
considering the three separation-of-powers concerns that have come
into sharper relief recently. Once the reader considers the competing
concerns below, the limitations of previously proposed solutions and
scholarship become apparent.
A. Improper Appointments?
The Appointments Clause governs the appointment of all
“Officers of the United States.”63 Federal “[o]fficers” are those who
“exercise significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States.”64 They fall into two categories—principal and inferior
officers.65 Principal officers, most likely those who report directly to
the President, must be nominated by the President and confirmed by
the Senate.66 But the so-called “Excepting Clause”67 to the
Appointments Clause gives Congress flexibility in the appointing of
inferior officers,68 that is, “officers whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential
nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate”69 or officers of
lesser importance as measured by some function of their duties,
tenure, and supervision.70 Inferior officers may be appointed in one of
63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509–10 (1878).
64. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
65. Germaine, 99 U.S. at 509 (“The Constitution for purposes of appointment very clearly
divides all its officers into two classes [viz., ‘primary’ and ‘inferior’ officers].”) (quoted in Weiss v.
United States, 510 U.S. 163, 183 (1994) (Souter, J., concurring) (referring to officers as “principal
and inferior officers”)).
66. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).
67. Id. at 660 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 627–28 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911)).
68. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
69. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.
70. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988).
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the following four ways, as Congress “think[s] proper”: in the same
manner as principal officers, by the President alone, by a Court of
Law, or by the Head of a Department.71 The Appointments Clause
does not apply to those who are “mere employees.”72 A preliminary
issue surrounding ALJs is whether they are inferior officers or mere
employees.
If they are inferior officers, many ALJs’ appointments are
likely improper. Although the Excepting Clause permits Congress to
bestow the appointment power of inferior officers on department
heads, Congress has not done so for all ALJs. Instead, Congress,
through the APA, permits “[e]ach agency” to select its ALJs “as are
necessary.”73 Departments and agencies, despite their similarity, are
not identical. An “agency” is a statutory term that refers to “each
authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is
within or subject to review by another agency,” save for a few
enumerated exceptions.74 But a “department” is a constitutional
animal that refers to a “freestanding component of the Executive
Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other such
component”75 with a “distinct province, in which a class of duties are
[sic] allotted.”76 Because an agency need not have the two key
characteristics of a department (independence and self-containment
from other administrative entities), not all agencies that appoint ALJs
are departments. Those ALJs selected by a nondepartment “agency”
are not properly appointed under the Appointments Clause.77
71. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
72. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976) (per curiam) (citing Auffmordt v.
Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878)).
73. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006).
74. Id. § 551(1).
75. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010).
76. Id. at 3162 (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, Department Definition, in AMERICAN DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (photo. reprint 1995) (1828) (def. 2)).
77. For each ALJ appointment, one must know which entity is appointing and whether
that entity is a department. Justice Breyer prepared a list of agencies that employ ALJs in his
dissent in Free Enterprise Fund. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3214 app. C (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Most federal ALJs work for the SSA, see id., which is likely a department because it
is independent and self-contained. See 42 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2006). But several of the other listed
agencies—including the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, among others—may not qualify as
departments. See Kent Barnett, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s Appointment with
Trouble, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1459 (2011) (arguing that the Court’s definition of “department” does
not clarify whether independence and self-containment are both necessary, or individually
sufficient, characteristics for departmental status); see also Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that
the FDIC abandoned its argument that the Office of Thrift Supervision, which selected ALJs,
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But for the method of selection to acquire constitutional import,
ALJs must be officers, not mere employees. To determine ALJs’
status, one must decide whether ALJs “exercis[e] significant authority
pursuant to the laws of the United States”78 or serve as “lesser
functionaries”79—an inquiry reminiscent of distinguishing High
Baroque from Rococo.80 Yet, the determination is important because a
“defect in [an ALJ’s] appointment [is] an irregularity which would
invalidate a resulting order.”81
ALJs appear to exercise significant authority under federal
law. Their positions are established by law.82 ALJs provide initial
decisions that establish factual findings and apply agency regulations
and policy.83 ALJs have significant discretion to oversee discovery,
issue subpoenas, and sanction parties in regulatory, enforcement, and
licensing proceedings.84 A party’s violation of certain ALJ orders can
lead to criminal penalties.85 During administrative review, the agency
must provide some deference to the ALJ’s credibility findings and

was a department). By adopting my solution in Part IV, infra, one can avoid this tedious, and
perhaps ultimately indeterminate, inquiry into departmental status for those agencies
appointing numerous ALJs.
Moreover, if various agencies are not departments, the approbation doctrine (i.e., a
department head’s approval cures a subordinate’s otherwise unconstitutional appointment) will
not likely salvage the otherwise unconstitutional appointments. The APA does not expressly
permit department heads to approbate subordinate agencies’ ALJ appointments, and thus any
approbation would lack statutory authority. See Barnett, supra, at 1481 n.161 (citing United
States v. Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 532–33 (1888); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385,
393–94 (1868)).
78. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
79. Id. at 126 n.162 (citing Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United States v.
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878)).
80. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3178–82 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Landry, 204
F.3d at 1132–34. The Office of Legal Counsel has prepared a lengthy memorandum that
addresses characteristics that distinguish employees from officers. Memorandum from Steven G.
Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the
General Counsels of the Executive Branch, Regarding Officers of the United States Within the
Meaning
of
the
Appointments
Clause
3
(Apr.
16,
2007),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2007 /appointmentsclausev10.pdf. The memo concludes that an officer
must have been delegated sovereign authority in a “continuing” fashion. See id. But the drafters
freely concede that “the Supreme Court has not articulated the precise scope and application of
the Clause’s requirements.” See id.
81. United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952).
82. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133.
83. See Timony, supra note 2, at 812.
84. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134 (comparing similar duties to special trial judges within the
U.S. Tax Court, whom the Supreme Court in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991),
held were inferior officers); Timony, supra note 2, at 812–13.
85. See Timony, supra note 2, at 813.
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consider the ALJ’s decision.86 Within some agencies, these findings are
generally final.87
In light of others whom the Supreme Court has deemed inferior
officers, ALJs’ authority seems more than sufficient to provide similar
status. The Court has held that district-court clerks, thousands of
clerks within the Treasury and Interior Departments, an assistant
surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election monitors, federal marshals,
military judges, Article I judges, and the general counsel for the
Transportation Department are inferior officers.88 Perhaps, then, it is
not surprising that five current Justices have suggested that ALJs
also rise to this level.89
But Congress and the D.C. Circuit (the last court to have its
say on the issue) may think otherwise. Congress referred to ALJs in
the APA as “presiding employee[s],”90 although this reference might be
understood as a lingering indignity from the ALJs’ “hearing examiner”
past.91 Likewise, the D.C. Circuit held in Landry v. FDIC that ALJs
appointed by the Office of Thrift Supervision were employees, despite
their significant authority, because they have no statutory authority
to issue final opinions.92 The majority concluded that the Court in
Freytag v. Commissioner held that special trial judges for the U.S. Tax
Court (“STJs”) were inferior officers only because they had the power
to issue final decisions.93 The majority acknowledged that the Freytag
Court stated that it would not have altered its conclusion even if the
STJs’ nonfinal decisionmaking powers were less significant.94 But the
Landry majority held that the Freytag Court would not have then
mentioned the STJs’ final decisionmaking powers (which were not

86. See id. at 811–12.
87. See id. at 812.
88. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3179 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
cases).
89. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by three other justices); Freytag, 501 U.S. at 920
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment, joined by Kennedy, J.). But see
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10 (majority opinion joined by Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.)
(suggesting, in dicta, that ALJs may be employees).
90. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006); see also id. § 554(d) (referring to ALJs as “[t]he employee who
presides”). But see id. § 556(b)(3) (referring to ALJs as “administrative law judges”).
91. See supra note 2.
92. Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also Antonin Scalia, The ALJ
Fiasco—A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 71 (1979) (describing ALJs’ inability to issue final
decisions).
93. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134.
94. Id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882).
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employed in the Freytag case) unless those powers were “critical to the
Court’s decision.”95
Judge Randolph dissented in Landry and had the better
argument. As he demonstrated, the Freytag Court’s discussion of the
STJs’ finality power was part of an alternative holding,96 provided
after the Court had announced its conclusion that “a special trial
judge is an inferior Office[r] whose appointment must conform to the
Appointments Clause.”97 The authority to issue final decisions thus
was not a necessary criterion. Indeed, federal magistrate judges, like
ALJs, provide only initial decisions that a district court may review de
novo, and they have long been deemed “inferior Officers” subject to
appointment by “Courts of Law.”98 Moreover, had ALJs the power to
issue final decisions, they well could be transformed into principal
officers, whose “work [would not be] directed and supervised at some
level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with
the advice and consent of the Senate.”99 Indeed, the Supreme Court in
Edmond v. United States held that the judges of the Coast Guard
Court of Criminal Appeals were inferior, not principal, officers because
they “have no power to render a final decision on behalf of the United
States unless permitted to do so by other Executive officers.”100 The
agencies’ power to overrule, in other words, merely establishes ALJs’
status as inferior officers.
Aside from this substantial constitutional concern, the ALJselection process is less than satisfactory to ALJs, agencies, and those
affected by agency adjudication. ALJs have complained about the
OPM’s lack of interest in the selection process and recently revised
selection criteria,101 and scholars have complained about the

95. Id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882).
96. Id. at 1142 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
97. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
98. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1143 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment) (citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 352–54 (1931); Rice v.
Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 378 (1901); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d
537, 545 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc)). But see Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect:
Identifying Which Government Workers Are Constitutionally Required to Be Appointed, 76 MO. L.
REV. 1143, 1178–80 (2011) (arguing that a government worker should be deemed to have
“significant authority” (as required for status as an “officer”) only if that worker’s actions are
“final,” as that term is understood under the APA).
99. Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997)).
100. Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665.
101. See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 105–06.
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overbearing impact of the veterans’ preference.102 The agencies, too,
have felt constrained by the Rule of Three and have sought a greater
role in selecting ALJs with expertise in the agencies’ subject
matters.103 Accordingly, even if current ALJ selection does not violate
the Appointments Clause, key actors in the selection process—
particularly ALJs and the agencies—are dissatisfied with the current
regime.
B. Improperly Impeding Presidential Supervision?
ALJs’ tenure protection also presents a substantial
constitutional question after Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.104 The
Court’s 5-4 decision in that case invalidated Congress’s use of two
layers of tenure protection to shield Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) members from the President’s removal.105
The SEC could appoint and remove PCAOB members.106 One (implied)
tenure-protection provision protected members of the SEC from the
President’s at-will removal,107 and a second (statutory) tenureprotection provision protected PCAOB members from the SEC’s at-will
removal.108 The Court invalidated this scheme because the two tiers of
tenure protection together unconstitutionally impinged the President’s
supervisory power by preventing him from holding the SEC
responsible for PCAOB’s actions in the same manner as he could hold
the SEC accountable for its other responsibilities.109
As Justice Breyer argued in his dissent, Free Enterprise Fund
suggests that ALJs’ tenure protections are also in jeopardy.110 Like
PCAOB members, two tiers of tenure protection shield ALJs from the
President’s control. As for the first tier, ALJs may be removed only for
good cause,111 meaning that “[ALJs] [a]re not to be . . . discharged at
the whim or caprice of the agency or for political reasons.”112 That good
102. See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 2, at 115–16 (describing how a ten-point increase for
certain veterans (1) substantially impacts eligible candidates’ ordering because the scores have
only a twenty-point range and (2) limits the number of women candidates).
103. See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
104. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
105. Id. at 3147.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 3148–49.
108. Id. at 3148.
109. Id. at 3154.
110. Id. at 3180–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006).
112. Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conf., 345 U.S. 128, 142 (1953).
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cause must be established by the MSPB,113 whose members are
shielded from the President’s at-will removal by a second tier of tenure
protection.114 (Indeed, a third tier of tenure protection may exist if the
agency, such as the SEC, that may seek removal is independent and
has its own tenure protection.115) Justice Breyer argued that the
majority’s decision suggested that “every losing party before an ALJ
now ha[s] grounds to appeal on the basis that the decision entered
against him is unconstitutional.”116 The majority responded that its
“holding does not address . . . [ALJs],” while suggesting that ALJs may
be permitted additional protections based on their ambiguous
officer/employee status or their adjudicative, as opposed to
policymaking, functions.117
The majority’s proposed distinctions118 are unsound as stated,
devaluing the dicta for lower courts and rendering Justice Breyer’s
premonition all the more foreboding. First, the majority suggests,
without explanation, that Congress may limit the President’s
supervisory power over employees to a greater degree than officers.119
That the President needs supervisory control over policymakers,
however, does not mean that he should have less, as opposed to equal,
control over those who perform mostly ministerial, yet often still
discretionary and important, tasks. The President should be able to
oversee all people who implement executive policy because doing so is
necessary for the President to take care that the law is faithfully
executed.120 After all, it would be odd, at the very least, if the
113. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
114. Id. § 1202(d).
115. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 701 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“[Independent agency] is the term that traditionally has been applied . . . to agencies
. . . whose heads are not removable at will.”), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
116. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3181 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the
holding does not specifically address this issue).
117. Id. at 3160 n.10 (majority opinion). I previously suggested another manner of limiting
the majority’s opinion to prevent the invalidation of ALJs’ tenure protections. See Kent Barnett,
Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1397–99 (2012)
(arguing that the particular combination of tenure protections for ALJs does not impermissibly
interfere with the President’s supervisory power).
118. Despite the majority’s eschewal or rejection of functionalism in Free Enterprise Fund’s
discussion of the President’s removal power, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative
Federalism, the New Formalism, and the Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund
and the Problem of Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law,
61 DUKE L.J. 1599, 1602 (2012); infra note 191 and accompanying text, these distinctions
concerning ALJs are conspicuously functional.
119. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10.
120. Compare generally id. (invalidating tenure protection for inferior officers whom a
department head of an independent agency appointed), with Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
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President were to have more control over cabinet members confirmed
by the Senate than the President’s own administrative assistants.
Second, the President does not necessarily need less
supervisory authority over ALJs merely because they engage in
adjudication.121 After all, “agencies use adjudication to form policy.”122
Indeed, certain agencies, such as the National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”), create policy primarily through adjudication, not
rulemaking.123 Moreover, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his dissent,
the PCAOB members, like ALJs, also exercised adjudicatory powers
provided by statute, but the majority invalidated their tenure
protection anyway without mentioning those powers.124 Nevertheless,
as discussed in Parts IV.C.1 and IV.C.3 of this Article, ALJs’ sole
adjudicatory function—in formal proceedings—should permit
Congress to limit the President’s supervisory power over ALJs without
undermining the majority’s decision.125
Ultimately, like the selection methods for ALJs, ALJs’ tieredtenure-protection provisions may or may not prove to be
constitutional. But at the very least, the Court has flagged a serious
issue concerning ALJs’ potentially excessive tenure protection. And
this question, like the appointments question, can be resolved without
awaiting a definitive answer from the Supreme Court.
C. Insufficient Impartiality?
Whether or not the Court would invalidate ALJs’ tenure
protection, their limited independence raises impartiality, and thus
due process, concerns. Scholars have disagreed as to whether ALJs are

173–74 (1926) (approving of Civil Service protections, despite invalidating tenure protection for
inferior officers appointed by department heads of executive, as opposed to independent,
agencies).
121. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10.
122. Bruff, supra note 47, at 356; accord SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202–03 (1947).
123. See John L. Gedid, ALJ Ethics: Conundrums, Dilemmas, and Paradoxes, 11 WIDENER
J. PUB. L. 33, 38 n.23 (2002) (explaining how in its first fifty years of existence the NLRB made
all its decisions through adjudication and did not promulgate a single rule).
124. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3177 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125. Although ALJs for a handful of agencies may (but rarely do) preside over formal
rulemaking proceedings, see supra note 4, their function is nearly identical in these proceedings
because they help prepare a formal record and, at times, provide an initial decision. See, e.g., Jim
Rossi, Final, But Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 53,
60 (2004). Because the function of ALJs is essentially unchanged and ALJs are essentially bound
by the same APA requirements for both formal adjudication and rulemaking, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 556,
557 (2006), their limited and rare ability to preside over rulemaking should not require
additional presidential supervisory power.
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sufficiently independent to ensure their impartiality. Some Supreme
Court decisions, for their part, strongly suggest that ALJs’
independence suffices under the Due Process Clause, but their limited
rationales are not wholly satisfying. The Court’s recent decision in
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,126 however, may suggest that the
method of ALJs’ appointment and removal provides too little
independence. Although Caperton concerned state judicial elections,
its reasoning and concern over impartiality applies equally, if not with
more strength, to administrative adjudication.
My purpose here is not to describe or critique fully the
numerous arguments in academic literature concerning the nature
and breadth, whether normative or descriptive, of ALJ independence.
What follows, instead, is a brief synthesis of the arguments concerning
ALJ impartiality, a critical review of often-invoked Supreme Court
decisions, and an assessment of the impact that Caperton and Free
Enterprise Fund may have on the due process issue. As with the ALJ
appointment and presidential-supervision concerns, the purpose here
is merely to identify the significant constitutional concern, not to
resolve whether a constitutional violation exists.
1. Brief Overview of the Impartiality Debate
Due
process
demands
impartiality
and
fairness.127
Independence can further these values, but the amount of
independence necessary will depend upon the interest at issue and the
extent of the decisionmaker’s authority.128 Because an ALJ has a role
in accomplishing “an agency task,” as opposed to reviewing the other
branches’ actions, she “cannot be entirely impartial.”129 The question
126. 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
127. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (outlining situations in which the
probability of actual bias on the part of the decisionmaker is constitutionally intolerable); Henry
J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279–87 (1975) (describing the
elements of a fair hearing); Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 9–10 (stressing the importance of
impartial adjudications for ALJs); Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State
Central Hearing Agency: Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ADMIN. L.
REV. 475, 479 (2001) (explaining that the hearing must be at a meaningful time in a meaningful
manner to fulfill the fundamental due process requisite of providing “an opportunity to be
heard”).
128. See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1214 (citing Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by
“Judicial Independence”?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 325 (2003)) (arguing that independence is also
not “an all-or-nothing” proposition and that it is useful only to the extent that it furthers
impartiality and separation of powers).
129. Gedid, supra note 123, at 54; see also id. at 38 (“ALJs are not impartial and neutral in
the same sense as Article III judges, but frequently have a role in developing and applying
agency policy.”).

2b. Barnett_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

818

4/23/2013 4:41 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:3:797

is, then, whether ALJs are sufficiently independent to ensure
sufficient impartiality.
Some aspects of ALJ selection and removal suggest insufficient
independence to guarantee impartiality. The agency has the ability to
select the ALJ candidate (from the three submitted candidates) whom
it believes will be most sympathetic to agency positions.130 The ALJ,
perhaps regardless of his or her background or predisposition to
agency views, becomes inculcated with agency prerogatives and
concerns.131 The agency often serves as a party to an administrative
proceeding and can initiate an ALJ’s removal.132 Indeed, this
“[r]emoval authority has always been associated with control: It is the
sine qua non of effective supervision—the guarantee that subordinates
will take direction.”133 This concern over the removal power becomes
more urgent if ALJs’ tenure protections are invalidated, as Justice
Breyer fears, because the MSPB’s review of an agency’s at-will
removal of an ALJ would be meaningless.134 Finally, ALJs have
indicated that agencies are perceived to interfere with ALJ decisions,
and twenty-six percent of ALJs for the SSA have complained of
Agency pressure to rule differently.135 An ALJ’s inculcation,

130. But the agency’s power seems similar to the President’s in selecting Article III judges.
The President often selects judicial candidates who are likely to share the President’s judicial or
political philosophy. And, indeed, the Senate and the President can select candidates whom they
perceive as favoring the federal government’s position.
131. Pillai, supra note 2, at 124–25; see also Bruff, supra note 47, at 352 (“[T]hose who work
within an agency are subject to a multitude of open or subtle socializing pressures that do not
reach a separate institution.”).
132. See Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 34–35 (discussing how agencies oversee the
conduct of ALJs to ensure competence and civility, and can remove ALJs for good cause).
133. Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent Counsel: Court
Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363, 421 (2001) (citing Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)); accord Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157
(2010) (“The President has been given the power to oversee executive officers; he is not
limited . . . to persuading his unelected subordinates to do what they ought to do without
persuasion. In its pursuit of a ‘workable government,’ Congress cannot reduce the Chief
Magistrate to a cajoler-in-chief.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)).
134. See supra Part II.B.
135. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 271,
280 (1994) (discussed in Moliterno, supra note 60, at nn.94 & 108); Martin H. Redish &
Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Value of Procedural Due Process, 95
YALE L.J. 455, 499 (1986) (“Evidence suggests that various agencies have used the possibility of
removal as a tool for coercing decisions that are consistent with the agency’s wishes.”); see also
Redish & Marshall, supra, at 477 (“[I]f the adjudicator is himself an integral part of the
governmental body on the other side of the case, then it is likely that his decision will be based
on considerations other than the merits as developed by the evidence.”).

2b. Barnett_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2013]

RESOLVING THE ALJ QUANDARY

4/23/2013 4:41 PM

819

appointment, and limited tenure protections create, the argument
goes, both apparent and actual bias concerns.136
But ALJs have significant indicia of independence that support
their impartiality. The OPM, after scoring ALJ candidates, limits
agencies’ discretion in selecting candidates.137 The agencies can only
initiate removal proceedings; they must convince another independent
agency that good cause exists for the ALJ’s removal.138 This tenure
protection appears meaningful because, despite numerous attempts,
agencies have convinced the MSPB to remove only five ALJs as of
2006.139 Indeed, “it is generally understood [based on statutory and
constitutional restrictions] that presidential supervision . . . should
steer clear of interference in adjudications, no matter who performs
them.”140 The APA promotes this understanding by limiting the ALJs’
ex parte contacts with parties,141 limiting the duties that the agency
can assign ALJs,142 restricting those who can directly supervise
ALJs,143 restricting the agencies’ ability to award “merit” pay or
provide a performance rating,144 and expressly requiring ALJs to act
impartially.145
Indeed, indicia of independence may be irrelevant to, or at least
unnecessary for, impartiality. Only nine percent of non-SSA ALJs
report feeling pressured to rule differently.146 And administrative
judges (“AJs”), who lack ALJs’ structural protections and preside over
informal administrative adjudications,147 had less anxiety over their
impartiality and independence than ALJs.148 Surely, the argument
136. Gedid, supra note 123, at 40 (citing Pillai, supra note 2, at 124–25).
137. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
139. Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1222 n.150.
140. Bruff, supra note 47, at 350.
141. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(1), 557(d) (2006).
142. Id. § 554(d)(2).
143. Id.
144. Id. § 5372.
145. Id. § 556(b) (“The functions of presiding employees . . . shall be conducted in an
impartial manner.”).
146. Moliterno, supra note 60, at n.108 (citing Koch, supra note 135, at 278).
147. See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Courts?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 227, 262 & n.249 (2008)
(citing RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 309 (4th ed. 2004))
(stating that informal adjudication is often presided over by AJs with lower pay and less
independence from the agency).
148. See Koch, supra note 135, at 279. If ALJs lack sufficient indicia of independence, then
impartiality concerns over AJs, who lack ALJs’ protections, would be even graver and threaten
much of the federal administrative state. Moreover, such a conclusion would also seem to bring
Article I judges’ impartiality into question because they have independence that is similar to
ALJs. Although certain concerns underlying my proposal also apply to AJs and Article I judges, I
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goes, the APA’s statutory protections and statistical evidence satisfy
the minimal standards of due process, especially in light of the
Supreme Court’s ready acceptance of most administrative
procedures149 and the indication from the AJs’ responses that
independence has little effect on an administrative adjudicator’s selfperception of impartiality.
2. Reassessing Existing Doctrine
Not surprisingly, scholars have disagreed as to whether ALJs
have sufficient indicia of impartiality.150 Despite the absence of
scholarly consensus, Professor Harold Bruff has stated that “the
Supreme Court has upheld this general arrangement against due
process attack.”151 Three Supreme Court decisions routinely come to
the APA’s defense in a Constitution-based impartiality challenge:
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference,152 Butz v.
Economou,153 and Withrow v. Larkin.154 Although certain of these
do not include them here because they do not likely face the same Appointments Clause
problems and because other factual distinctions exist between them and ALJs.
149. Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1347–51.
150. Compare, e.g., Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 4 n.11 (“[T]he APA protections
insulate ALJs far more than due process dictates.”), McNeil, supra note 127, at 511 (“[D]ue
process jurisprudence . . . [dispels] the notion that the measure of due process to which litigants
are entitled in administrative proceedings includes an independent adjudicator possessed of
salary and tenure protection . . . .”), and Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1347–51 (arguing that ALJs
need only so much independence as to ensure their impartiality and suggesting that impartiality
exists), with 2 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 442–43 (1959) (contending that relationship
between agency and ALJ creates actual and apparent bias), Gedid, supra note 123, at 40
(“[T]here is a strong argument that . . . for ALJ independence to exist, the ALJ cannot be
‘beholden’ to the agency for which she works for compensation, tenure, and/or conditions of
employment.” (citing Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, Judicial Independence: Can It Be
Without Article III?, 46 MERCER L. REV. 863, 864–65 (1995))), Levinson, supra note 25, at 537–38
(noting uncertainty as to ALJs’ impartiality), Lubbers, supra note 2, at 110 (stating that
“ALJs . . . are subject to doubts about their independence due in part to their employment,” but
not resolving whether ALJs are sufficiently independent or impartial), Redish & Marshall, supra
note 135, at 499, 504 (arguing that ALJs need salary and tenure protection similar or identical to
Article III judges to preserve due process), Timony, supra note 2, at 828 (concluding that
agencies’ ability to proceed against an ALJ creates an “appearance of impropriety”), and Karen
Y. Kauper, Note, Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law Judges: A Model
Administrative Law Judge Corps Statute, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537, 544 (1985).
151. Bruff, supra note 47, at 346 (referring to Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975)); id. at
347 (“Most administrative adjudication is not very vulnerable to constitutional invalidation
under the due process clause.”); see also Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1350–51.
152. 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
153. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
154. 421 U.S. 35 (1975). In Weiss v. United States, the Supreme Court upheld the use of
military judges despite their lack of a fixed term in office or lifetime tenure. See 510 U.S. 163,
179–81 (1994). But Weiss’s applicability to the civil administrative state is indeterminate. On one

2b. Barnett_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2013]

RESOLVING THE ALJ QUANDARY

4/23/2013 4:41 PM

821

decisions strongly suggest that ALJs are sufficiently impartial in fact
and appearance, scholars have not considered the impact of the
decisions’ limitations, especially after Caperton and Free Enterprise
Fund.
Ramspeck, for instance, has limited relevance. In Ramspeck,
ALJs challenged certain rules governing ALJs, which the precursor to
the OPM and the MSPB (the Civil Service Commission) promulgated
under the APA.155 No constitutional question was posed or answered.
In rejecting the ALJs’ contention that reductions in force were
impermissible under the APA, the Court stated that Congress
intended ALJs “not to be paid, promoted, or discharged at the whim or
caprice of the agency or for political reasons.”156 And the Court
referred to ALJs as “partially independent”157 and “semi-independent
subordinate hearing officers.”158 But these descriptions of
congressional intent do not answer whether Congress successfully
effectuated its intent, whether the protections provide sufficient
impartiality, or whether the protections offend the President’s
supervisory power.
The two remaining cases, however, are more germane. In Butz,
an individual brought suit against certain Department of Agriculture
officials who took part in an administrative adjudication.159 He
asserted several causes of action, including those premised on
violations of the Due Process Clause.160 The sole issue that the
Supreme Court resolved concerned the nature of immunity to which
the various officials were entitled.161 As in Ramspeck, the Court did
not decide whether ALJs have sufficient impartiality, but it hinted as
much. In determining that ALJs were entitled to absolute judicial
immunity, the Court stated that ALJs were “functionally comparable”
to judges162 and listed the APA’s panoply of protections to “guarantee
hand, the Court’s opinion suggests that lifetime or termed tenure is unnecessary for adjudicators
who are subject to removal by the executive branch. On the other hand, the Court refused to
apply Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), because that case applied in civil contexts,
suggesting that Mathews’s three-part balancing test may require more.
155. See Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 134 (outlining the arguments of each party).
156. Id. at 142.
157. Id. at 131.
158. Id. at 132.
159. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 481–82 (1978).
160. See id. at 482–83.
161. See id. at 485 (rejecting the United States’ argument that federal officials are immune
from damages liability even if the violation was knowing, was deliberate, and infringed
constitutional rights).
162. Id. at 513; accord Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1141
(D.D.C. 1984).
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[ALJs’] independence.”163 Indeed, absolute immunity “preserv[ed
ALJs’] independent judgment.”164 Nevertheless, the decision does not
discuss (at least in any detail) the power of removal and the internal
pressures that weigh on ALJs as agency officials despite the powerful
force that the Free Enterprise Fund Court would later understand the
removal power to have,165 much less explain why the APA’s
protections are sufficient to ensure impartiality.
Withrow likewise suggests that ALJs have sufficient
impartiality, but it, too, is not dispositive. In Withrow, a doctor
challenged the ability of a licensing board to preside over a
nonadversary, investigatory hearing and also a later adversary, merits
hearing.166 The Court unanimously upheld the arrangement. The
Court noted that it sought to “prevent even the probability of
unfairness”167 and that a challenge to the administrative structure
would have to “overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in
those serving as adjudicators,”168 in light of “a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weakness.”169 But the Court
found no problem because the board was merely determining whether
a full hearing was necessary, much like a judicial officer rendering a
probable cause determination, without deciding whether a regulatory
violation actually occurred.170 And the Court indicated that the Due
Process Clause does not require separated investigative and
adjudicatory functions for agency members.171
Withrow does not fully address the plight of ALJs. The Court’s
opinion, like that in Butz, does not address the effect of the removal
power on an adjudicator’s impartiality. Indeed, it does not address
ALJs at all. Instead, Withrow concerns the heads of agencies.172
Perhaps one might argue that if agency heads can investigate,
prosecute, adjudicate, and overrule ALJs’ opinions in toto, there
should be little concern over their subordinates’ impartiality. But that
argument overlooks ALJs’ functional judicial status and the different
163. Butz, 438 U.S. at 514.
164. Id.
165. See supra Part II.B (discussing significance of Free Enterprise Fund).
166. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 39–41 (1975).
167. Id. at 47.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See id. at 53–58 (explaining why board’s behavior was acceptable).
171. See id. at 52 (explaining that case law, and federal and state courts, support this
contention).
172. See id. at 55 n.20 (noting that the Agency employee actually performed the
investigation and an assistant attorney general presented the evidence to the board).
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expectations that parties have before a judge as opposed to an agency
member.173 The ALJ is a neutral individual whose opinion the agency
must review, and the ALJ’s neutrality and opinion have a meaningful
procedural and substantive effect. Although the agency can (but rarely
does) reverse an ALJ’s decision, the substance of the ALJ’s opinion
may matter for judicial review under the APA. The courts will review
only agency decisions adverse to a nonagency party (because if the
party prevails before the agency, the agency will not appeal its own
adverse decision, which it has the power to reverse, to the courts). The
ALJ’s opinion—especially as to facts and credibility—helps the court
determine the matter with the additional help of an educated neutral’s
view.174 The ALJ’s proceedings and opinion also provide an
administrative procedure to help protect fundamental rights in
adjudication and thereby create for the parties the reasonable
expectation of a fair, impartial proceeding. In short, the ALJ’s place
within the federal administrative apparatus does not mean that
impartiality and its concomitant indicia of independence are
irrelevant.
3. Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund’s Impact on Existing Doctrine
Even if Ramspeck, Butz, and Withrow together established that
ALJs have sufficient impartiality, the Court’s more recent decision in
Caperton may suggest otherwise. Indeed, Caperton does what those
decisions did not: it focuses on adjudicators’ selection and removal,
173. The Withrow Court also referred to Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971). See
Withrow, 421 U.S. at 49–50. In Perales, the Supreme Court rejected a social security claimant’s
argument that the ALJ’s duty to develop the record in nonadversarial hearings violated the Due
Process Clause. The Court held that doing so would “assume[] too much and would bring down
too many procedures designed, and working well, for a governmental structure of great and
growing complexity.” See Perales, 402 U.S. at 410. This conclusion is sound because the ALJ was
not an advocate for the Agency; the Agency was unrepresented. But the Perales Court’s
reasoning is not satisfying. The Court merely offers unsupported conclusions that (1) the
procedures are “working well” and (2) the procedures satisfy due process because the
government, which creates, implements, and potentially benefits from the procedures, has made
them ubiquitous. See id. Moreover, like Butz and Withrow, Perales does not address whether a
sharp Damoclean sword of removal dulls the ALJ’s impartiality. Perhaps the better support for
sufficient impartiality is found in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970) (“We agree . . . that
prior involvement in some aspects of a case will not necessarily bar a welfare official from acting
as a decision maker.”).
174. See, e.g., Novelty, Inc. v. DEA, 571 F.3d 1176, 1180–81 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Henderson, J.,
concurring) (“The DEA is the ultimate fact finder but ‘[t]he agency's departures from the [ALJ’s]
findings are vulnerable if they fail to reflect attentive consideration to the [ALJ’s] decision.’ ”
(quoting Greater Bos. Tel. Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1970))); Bos. Edison Co. v.
FERC, 885 F.2d 962, 968–69 (1st Cir. 1989); see infra note 195 (explaining that courts carefully
view agency findings contrary to ALJ factual findings).
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albeit in the judicial-election context. In Caperton, the president of a
corporate defendant, which was in the process of appealing an
unfavorable verdict, had contributed three million dollars to have
Justice Benjamin elected to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals.175 Justice Benjamin defeated the incumbent justice by fewer
than fifty thousand votes.176 In response to recusal motions, Justice
Benjamin said that he had no actual bias and that there was no
allegation of a quid pro quo arrangement.177
The U.S. Supreme Court held that due process required Justice
Benjamin’s recusal.178 Evidence of a quid pro quo agreement or of
actual bias was unnecessary.179 Instead, the Court was “concerned
with a more general concept of interests that tempt adjudicators to
disregard neutrality.”180 The Court was looking not necessarily for
Withrow’s
“probability
of
unfairness,”181
but
instead
an
“unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’ ”182 The Court suggested that
such bias exists
when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a significant and
disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing
the judge’s election campaign when the case was pending or imminent. . . . [S]imilar
fears of bias can arise when—without the other parties’ consent—a man chooses the
judge in his own cause.183

Applying this standard, the Court noted that the president of the
defendant-corporation knew that the appeal from an unfavorable
verdict was pending, the election was decided by fewer than fifty
thousand votes, and the president’s contributions had a significant
and disproportionate impact on the election.184 Because of this, the
Court found “a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required
175. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009).
176. See id. (noting Justice Benjamin received 382,036 votes while his rival received 334,301
votes).
177. See id. at 872–75, 886 (reviewing facts of case).
178. See id. at 884–87 (explaining reasons for holding).
179. See id. at 884–85 (arguing that risk of bias was substantial enough).
180. Id. at 878.
181. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
182. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465–66
(1971)). The Court enunciated another standard besides the “probability of unfairness” and the
“unconstitutional potential for bias.” The Court also indicated that it was looking for “the
probability of actual bias [that] rises to an unconstitutional level.” Id. at 887. Perhaps these
three standards can be reconciled. The “probability of actual bias” may be the same as the
“probability of unfairness,” with the unfairness being the actual bias. The “potential for bias”
may be unconstitutional only when it rises to the level of the probability of actual bias.
183. Id. at 870.
184. Id. at 885–86.
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Justice Benjamin’s recusal” because it appeared that the defendant
“ch[ose] the judge in [its] own cause.”185
Although the Court discussed its decision within the judicialelection context,186 its reasoning seems even more compelling when
applied to ALJs. Caperton appears to consider a party’s impact on a
judge’s selection and perhaps the effect that a losing party could have
to punish the judge who it helped place on the bench in future judicial
elections. West Virginia voters directly chose Justice Benjamin.
Nevertheless,
the
corporate
defendant’s
disproportionate
contributions’ indirect impact on the election created an
“unconstitutional potential for bias.” The government, like the
defendant in Caperton, is frequently a party to proceedings before the
ALJ. But the government directly chooses the ALJ from a list of three
candidates presented to it. If agencies obtain the ability to engage in
selective certification, their ability to appoint is even more unbounded.
In either case, the agency directly and literally “chooses the judge in
[its] own cause,” without, as in the case of federal judges, any approval
from another branch. Moreover, the agency is the party that can
initiate removal proceedings against the ALJ, not merely indirectly
fund opposition forces in a later election. Indeed, it is not even the
government in general that selects ALJs and initiates removal
proceedings; it is the very agency that appears before the ALJ.
Because the agency’s role in selecting and removing the ALJ is much
more direct than in Caperton, it is difficult to see how an
“unconstitutional potential for bias” does not exist for federal ALJs if
Caperton applies outside of the judicial-election context.
Moreover, as discussed previously in Part II.B, Free Enterprise
Fund suggests that the President must have sufficient supervisory
power over all members of the executive branch so that the President
can be held accountable for what his or her agents do. To ensure the
President’s supervisory power, the Court has begun limiting tenure
protections for executive officials, such as the PCAOB members.187 If
the Court were to follow suit with ALJs and permit the President or a
principal officer to remove ALJs for any reason, it is difficult to see
how an “unconstitutional potential for bias,” or indeed a “probability of
actual bias” would not exist. The President or a supervising officer
could, despite potential political backlash, have the ALJ find facts or
185. Id. at 886, 902.
186. Id. at 881–82 (“This problem arises in the context of judicial elections, a framework not
presented in the precedents we have reviewed and discussed.”).
187. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010) (agreeing with the
government that unconstitutional tenure provisions are severable).
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apply law in certain ways. Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that
“one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot
be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against the
latter’s will.”188 A challenge to the President’s supervision of ALJs may
not be merely a theoretical matter, given the Court’s recent, solicitous
reception to separation-of-powers challenges.189
Functional limitations on the President’s supervisory power—
such as the understood ability of ALJs to act without agency
interference190 and ALJs’ APA protections—may be less, if at all,
relevant to due process and removal-power inquiries after Free
Enterprise Fund. That decision strongly suggests that practical indicia
of independence or control are normally immaterial to the President’s
removal-power inquiry because the Court rejected Justice Breyer’s
functional inquiry that considered other, more meaningful methods of
presidential control, such as rulemaking powers.191 Instead, the Court
looked only to the President’s removal power and held that the lack of
sufficient removal power in the PCAOB scheme alone impeded the
President’s supervisory power.192 Supervision is merely the flipside to
independence. If the removal power is significant and apparently
necessary for adequate presidential supervision, the removal power
should have a similar, inverse impact on independence and
impartiality. The limited ability of Congress after Free Enterprise
Fund to rely on functional methods of control and independence is
what, in part, may render the ALJ’s quandary so difficult to solve.
Finally, the agency’s ability to overrule an ALJ on both fact
and law does not mean that an ALJ’s decision is meaningless.193 The

188. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
189. See generally Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (holding that bankruptcy court
lacked authority under Article III to enter judgment on state-law counterclaim); Free Enter.
Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3150–51 (deciding separation-of-powers issues on interlocutory review);
Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–83 (1995) (discussing claim, based on Appointments
Clause of Article II of the Constitution, that there was a “ ‘trespass upon the executive power of
appointment’ ”).
190. See supra note 140 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., Russell L. Weaver, Management of
ALJ Offices in Executive Departments and Agencies, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 303, 321 (1995) (“ALJs
who serve at agencies that have non-ALJ administrators repeatedly indicated that those
administrators have not attempted to interfere with their decisional independence.”).
191. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155–56 (refuting dissent’s position); id. at 3170–73
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing how the SEC controls PCAOB’s adjudicatory and rulemaking
authority).
192. See id. at 3158–59 (discussing threat posed by insufficient removal power); see also id.
at 3156–57 (discussing Framers’ view of importance of removal power).
193. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006) (describing ALJ’s initial decision authority); Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 494–97 (1951) (explaining importance of findings of
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ALJ’s credibility findings can be very significant, affecting whether
substantial evidence exists for an agency’s contrary decision on
administrative appeal.194 Indeed, courts review with a more careful
eye agency findings that are contrary to ALJs’ factual findings.195
Considering appellate courts’ more deferential review of final agency
action as compared to lower court factual findings,196 ALJs’
impartiality may be even more important than Article III judges’
impartiality.
Despite concerns over ALJ impartiality and despite Caperton
and Free Enterprise Fund’s contrary suggestion, the Supreme Court
may not find a due process violation, given its wariness of upsetting
long-standing administrative practices.197 But the absence of
constitutional infirmity does not mean that the current administrative
system is in excellent health. These concerns, like those that surround
ALJs’ selection and removal, support finding a new process of ALJ
selection and removal that all interested constituencies can champion.
III. OTHER PROPOSED, YET INCOMPLETE, REFORMS
Scholars and ALJs have proposed various changes to ALJs’
selection, removal, and independence. Some of the most promising
proposals, discussed below, include the creation of a unified ALJ corps
with a newly established supervising agency, ALJ self-regulation, and
even the provision of Article III protections to ALJs. But these
proposals fail to consider, much less resolve, all three separation-ofpowers issues surrounding ALJs. Each of these proposals thus has—
befitting ALJs’ current demigod status—an Achilles heel.198

examiner); Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1225 (acknowledging weight of authority given to ALJ
decisions).
194. See Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 496–97 (noting legislative committee reports
emphasize importance of ALJ decisions); see also Penasquitos Vill., Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074,
1079–81 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to enforce NLRB’s order and reversing an ALJ’s determination
that relied exclusively on testimony that the ALJ discredited).
195. Penasquitos Vill, Inc., 565 F.2d at 1078 (referring to NLRB v. Tom Johnson, Inc., 378
F.2d 342, 344 (9th Cir. 1967), and NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 499 (2d
Cir. 1967)).
196. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162–63 (1999) (explaining that the “ ‘substantial
evidence’ standard [for review of agency decisions] . . . is somewhat less strict than the [clearly
erroneous standard for the review of lower court factual findings]”); accord Chen v. Mukasey, 510
F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir. 2007) (“The substantial evidence standard . . . is more deferential than
the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard . . . .”).
197. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
198. In fairness to these proposals’ advocates, I am not aware of any scholarship that
directly examines all three problems. Moreover, the problematic nature of the ALJs’ tiered-
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A. Unified Corps
Perhaps the most popular remedial proposal is for a unified
ALJ corps (sometimes referred to as an ALJ central panel), appointed
and supervised by an existing or newly created independent agency.199
Under this proposal, ALJs are not appointed by or assigned to a
specific agency. Instead, a corps of ALJs, whose members an
independent agency appoints, hears cases from various agencies.200
Some of the central-panel proposals would permit ALJs to issue final
decisions.201
A federal ALJ corps, however, does not likely resolve the three
separation-of-powers concerns. The independent agency’s appointment
of ALJs would likely comply with the Appointments Clause because
the independent agency, if “not subordinate to or contained within any
other [executive] component,” would constitute a “department.”202 But
the presidential-supervision concerns remain because, without further
changes to the current appointment process, two tiers of tenure
protections would continue to shield ALJs from the President’s
control. The appointing agency would be independent because of
tenure protection for its head.203 And ALJs presumably would likewise

tenure protections, among other things, did not arise in any substantial way until June 2010
with Free Enterprise Fund.
199. See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 2, at 123–24 (discussing intensified movement for a
unified administrative trial court or centralized corps of judges); Moliterno, supra note 60, at
1227–33 (articulating support that the proposal for a central panel has received); Scalia, supra
note 92, at 79 (explaining improper influence issue could be resolved with a unified ALJ corps).
Similarly, the Federal ALJ Conference has proposed transferring the OPM’s selection assistance
of ALJs and other responsibilities to a new independent agency, the Administrative Law Judge
Conference. See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 105–07 (discussing history and reasons for proposal);
see also Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 38–40 (suggesting creation of an independent
oversight agency and discussing California’s Agency that oversees judicial conduct). But doing so
would not address any of the three stated concerns because it merely transfers currently existing
powers from one independent agency—that ALJs think has generally ignored them—to another
more sympathetic one. This transfer does not have heads of departments actually appoint ALJs,
alter the President’s supervisory power, or address ALJ independence.
200. See McNeil, supra note 127, at 480 (pointing out consistency of independence of ALJs
with due process requirements); Jim Rossi, Overcoming Parochialism: State Administrative
Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 568 (2001) (describing how corps of
ALJs promotes adjudicative independence).
201. See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1230 (comparing a central panel of ALJs to Article III
judges).
202. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (defining “department”).
203. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 701 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting) (“[Independent agency] is the term that traditionally has been applied . . . to agencies
. . . whose heads are not removable at will.”), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
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receive the tenure protection that they currently possess.204 If one or
both of the tenure-protection provisions are invalidated, substantial
due process concerns may exist because the new appointing and
removing agency—which may not be independent after a tieredtenure-protection analysis—may attempt to influence ALJs’ decisions
improperly.205 Moreover, even if the tenure protections are permissible
under Article II, any attempt to give ALJs the power to issue final
decisions places policy control within the ALJs, not the agencies
themselves, and thus limits the President’s ability to ensure that the
law is faithfully executed.206
Yet, even if an ALJ central panel did cure all three problems, a
federal ALJ corps is not likely in the offing. Numerous states have
created ALJ corps,207 which have received universal praise.208 Many
members of the committee that proposed the federal APA to Congress
advocated an ALJ corps.209 And since then, many scholars,
committees, members of the bar, a congressman, and ALJs have
joined the unsuccessful crusade.210 Even so, by 1992 the
204. See 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006) (listing possible actions against ALJs); MODEL ACT
CREATING A STATE CENTRAL HEARING AGENCY § 1–6(a)(3), (a)(4) (1997) (listing reasons for
removal).
205. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text (explaining probable bias that may
occur if President could remove ALJs for any reason); see also Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Special
Problems of State Administrative Law Judges, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 417 (2001) (proposing that
ALJ corps is “removable only for good cause and, then, only after notice and an opportunity to be
heard by an impartial tribunal”); Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 45 (explaining that ALJs in
certain states, such as Texas, can be removed at will by the Chief ALJ).
206. Cf. Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence, and Administrative Courts: The
Recent Changes in Louisiana’s Administrative Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431, 463 (1999)
(noting separation-of-powers problems that arose when Louisiana permitted ALJs to issue final
decisions from which a losing agency could not appeal).
207. Rossi, supra note 200, at 568; see Patricia E. Salkin, Judging Ethics for Administrative
Law Judges: Adoption of a Uniform Code of Judicial Conduct for the Administrative Judiciary,
11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7, 13 n.18 (2002) (listing twenty-four states that have adopted central
panels).
208. See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1229 (citing Thomas E. Ewing, Oregon’s Hearing
Officer Panel, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 57, 89 (2003); Allen C. Hoberg, Administrative
Hearings: State Central Panels in the 1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75, 78 (1994); Bruce H. Johnson,
Strengthening Professionalism Within an Administrative Hearing Office: The Minnesota
Experience, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 446 (2001)). Nonetheless, a common criticism of the ALJ
corps is that agencies lose the efficiency and specialized knowledge that exists when ALJs are
housed within individual agencies. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 57, at 516.
209. See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1227.
210. See Lubbers, supra note 2, at 123–24 (explaining the LaMacchia Committee’s 1973
recommendation for study of an ALJ corps and former ABA President Bernard Segal’s advocacy
for an independent ALJ corps in 1976); id. at 124 (advocating “increased scrutiny” for the ALJ
corps proposal); Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1229 (collecting scholarly and ALJ proposals); see
also GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 22 (“The ALJ Corps option was proposed repeatedly in
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Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”)
recommended that Congress not create an ALJ corps.211 Given the
ACUS’s lack of support for an ALJ corps and the proposal’s failure to
gain political traction after more than sixty years, the proposal to
create a federal ALJ corps appears moribund.
B. Self-Regulation
Another set of proposals grants ALJs the power to selfregulate. Other professions, such as Article III judges, lawyers, and
physicians, regulate the conduct of their members.212 Indeed, because
Federal Judicial Councils monitor judicial behavior, Congress has
largely avoided regulating judges.213 Under one general proposal,
ALJs would be permitted to create an ethics code,214 investigate
alleged ALJ wrongdoing, and impose sanctions for inappropriate
conduct.215 Under another self-regulation proposal, a new independent
agency of ALJs would assume the OPM’s current ALJ-selectionassistance duties, improve the formal administrative adjudicatory
process, and ensure compliance with ethical standards.216
These proposals do not address appointment, removal, or
impartiality concerns. Neither proposal alters ALJs’ current
questionable method of selection by heads of agencies who are not
heads of departments. Neither appears to alter ALJs’ two tiers of
tenure protection or the existing removal mechanisms, and thus
neither proposal gives the ALJs more than the power to recommend or
impose certain adverse action against a derelict ALJ. Because ALJs’
selection and removal are essentially left unaltered under both
proposals, self-regulation would have a minimal impact on
impartiality concerns. The failure to consider the selection bias, the
agency-view inculcation, and threat of removal renders the
Congress between 1983 and 1995.”); Scalia, supra note 92, at 79 (discussing ALJ corps’s
beneficial effect on efficiency and likely detrimental effect on accountability and supervision);
Timony, supra note 2, at 819 (discussing Senator Heflin’s 1983 bill to create a unified corps).
211. See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1228 (referring to PAUL R. VERKUIL ET AL., ADMIN.
CONF. OF THE U.S., THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 1059 (1992)).
212. Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 43–45.
213. Id. at 43.
214. ALJs’ unsettled ethical duties are a perennial subject of academic discussion. See
generally Salkin, supra note 207, at 7–32; Ronnie A. Yoder, The Role of the Administrative Law
Judge, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 321, 321–48 (2002); Diana Gillis, Note, Closing an
Administrative Loophole: Ethics for the Administrative Judiciary, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 863,
863–76 (2009).
215. Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 43.
216. See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 106–07.
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promulgation and enforcement of an ethics code an ineffective tool to
improve actual and perceived ALJ impartiality.
C. Article III Protections
A third suggestion provides ALJs essentially the same tenure
protections that Article III judges enjoy. To combat agency pressure on
ALJ decisionmaking, two prominent scholars have proposed giving
ALJs lifetime salary protection and permitting their removal only
through a statutory-impeachment process.217 This proposal should
remedy any lingering due process concerns, even after Caperton and
Free Enterprise Fund, because ALJs would have the same
independence as Article III judges, although that independence would
arise from statutory, not constitutional, law.218
But this proposal does not resolve appointment or supervision
concerns. The proposal fails to alter ALJs’ selection, leaving heads of
agencies, as opposed to departments, to select some ALJs.219 Moreover,
it would exacerbate presidential-supervision concerns. To be sure, this
reform would remove one tier of tenure protection and thus may, at a
superficial level, solve the problem presented in Free Enterprise Fund.
Yet removal through impeachment completely deprives the executive
branch of power to seek an ALJ’s removal because the House of
Representatives, not the executive branch, initiates impeachment
proceedings.220 Thus, even if this proposal resolves due process
217. See Redish & Marshall, supra note 135, at 499; see also id. at 504 (“[D]ue process is
inadequately protected when an individual must depend on an adjudicator who lacks salary and
tenure protection (such as most state court judges and all ALJs) to protect an entitlement to a
life, liberty, or property interest.”). Redish and Marshall’s proposal is vague as to whether the
salary and tenure protections are lifetime protections. They do not use the term “lifetime,” but
they do mention the protections and then state that “ALJs would then be shielded from such
pressures in much the same way that article III judges are.” See id. at 499.
218. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. But others have concluded that Article III protections are
unnecessary under due process jurisprudence. See McNeil, supra note 127, at 511; Daniel J.
Meltzer, The Judiciary’s Bicentennial, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 433 (1989) (suggesting that salary
and tenure protections may render judges more political, not apolitical).
219. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
220. If the proposed statutory impeachment models constitutional impeachment, the House
of Representatives would impeach ALJs, and the Senate would preside over the trial and decide
whether to convict. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4; art. I, §§ 2–3. The President has no role in the
impeachment process. Although the Supreme Court in United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483,
483–85 (1886), held that Congress could limit the incidental removal power when a department
head appoints an inferior officer, the removal of the cadet-engineer in Perkins had to proceed
through a court martial, an organ of the executive branch. It is far from clear that Congress
could permit a department head to appoint and then usurp the removal power through a
statutory-impeachment process, leaving the President or department head without any role in
the sole removal process.
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concerns, it leaves unaddressed Appointments Clause problems and
presidential-supervision difficulties of the highest magnitude.
IV. AN INTERBRANCH-APPOINTMENT REMEDY
These proposals, even if incomplete or politically unpalatable,
demonstrate the widespread sense that ALJs are not operating, to
paraphrase Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss, in the best of all possible
worlds.221 In the spirit of creating a better administrative world, I
propose that Congress assign the power to appoint (and the incidental
power to discipline and remove) ALJs to the “Courts of Law,” namely
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. I first briefly outline
the key portions of my statutory proposal for the D.C. Circuit to
appoint and discipline ALJs. I then further explain why I have
structured the proposal as I have to resolve the three constitutional
questions and address agencies’ and ALJs’ concerns. Although, as
discussed above, other structural proposals have tended to disappear
into the political ether, my proposal may be able to gain more traction
because it gives, through a relatively simple statutory change, both
agencies and ALJs some, but not all, of what they want.
A. General Mechanics of an ALJ Interbranch Appointment
Under a new statute and its implementing rules, the D.C.
Circuit should appoint, discipline, and remove ALJs. The court has the
knowledge, time, and logistics to do so. It is widely considered the
most influential court on matters of administrative law, routinely
reviewing numerous important administrative law cases, including
ALJs’ decisions.222 The court also has a substantially lighter caseload

221. See e.g., VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 84 (ch.1, ll. 42–44) (Librairie Nizet 1959) (1759).
222. See, e.g., GORDON BERMANT ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE CASES OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 3–4 (1982) (estimating that
forty-five percent of “high burden agency cases” are filed in the D.C. Circuit); John M. Golden,
The Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 554 (2010) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit . . . hears a disproportionate share of the
United States’ administrative law cases.”) (citing John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C.
Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 376–77 (2006) (“One-third of the D.C.
Circuit appeals are from agency decisions. That figure is less than twenty percent nationwide.”));
Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of
Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1103 n.14 (2001) (citing
Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1193,
1202 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the
Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 621 & n.2 (1994)) (noting that D.C. Circuit decides nearly onethird of all direct appeals from federal agencies).
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than all other federal circuits.223 With the administrative assistance of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (“AOC”), its
judges have the capacity for the administrative duty of selecting and
disciplining ALJs. The Circuit also has the added benefit of a prime
location. Like numerous ALJs, most agencies, and the AOC, the D.C.
Circuit is based in D.C.
The selection process could proceed much in the same way that
it does now. ALJ candidates could continue to take the preliminary
examination that the OPM currently administers under the D.C.
Circuit’s auspices, with the AOC’s administrative support.224 After the
examination, with the AOC’s assistance, the D.C. Circuit could then
assign each candidate a score based on his or her examination,
experience, and qualifications, much as the OPM does now.225 Through
a notice-and-comment procedure that the courts of appeals currently
use for bankruptcy-judge candidates,226 the court could then solicit
comments on the three highest-scoring candidates. The agency for
which the ALJ would work would, like other interested parties, be
able to provide comments and indicate its preferred candidate from
one of the three candidates.
But the agency, unlike other interested parties, could also
submit its own candidate and thereby create a roster of four

223. The D.C. Circuit decided 173 cases on the merits per active judge in 2010. In
comparison, the national average was 459. Relatively small circuits decided more cases on the
merits per judge: 502 for the Eighth Circuit, 415 for the First Circuit, and 242 for the Tenth
Circuit. See Federal Court Management Statistics December 2010: Courts of Appeals, U.S.
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsa2010Dec.pl (last visited Nov. 30,
2012) (select circuit for report at prompt); see also Susan Low Bloch & Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the Federal Courts of the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J.
549, 562 n.63 (2002) (referring to Jonathan Groner, Circuit Pick Caught in the Middle: GOP
Senator Questions Need to Fill Vacancy, LEGAL TIMES, June 1, 2000, at 1); John B. Oakley,
Precedent in the Federal Courts of Appeals: An Endangered or Invasive Species, 8 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 123, 126 (2006). Indeed, the relatively light caseload may explain what some view as
the D.C. Circuit’s “unusually intrusive approach to administrative law.” See Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., Comment, Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1126
(1995). Although some have attributed the D.C. Circuit’s smaller caseload to the complexity of its
cases, see, e.g., Bruff, supra note 222, at 1236, I am skeptical. In my admittedly anecdotal
experience, death-penalty, prisoner-rights, and habeas cases can be extremely time-consuming,
with large records and inadequate briefing. The D.C. Circuit hears few of these cases. See U.S.
COURTS, supra (select D.C. Circuit at prompt).
224. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
225. See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Official Notice, Sixth Circuit Judicial Council, Office of the Circuit Exec. (May
29, 2011), available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/documents/TNM_Public_Notice.pdf
(request for comment on bankruptcy-judge candidates).
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candidates.227 If the agency submits a candidate for consideration,
interested parties could then provide comments on the agency’s
submitted candidate. After considering the examination and the
received comments, the D.C. Circuit would appoint the ALJ from the
list of three or four candidates, under what I refer to as a new “Rule of
Three or Four.” Each agency would retain the authority to determine
the number of ALJs that it needs.228
Agencies, among others, could request that the D.C. Circuit
discipline or remove an ALJ for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance,” the same standard that governs bankruptcy judges229
and numerous other federal adjudicators.230 Per statute, any agency
complaint concerning an ALJ would be placed on a “fast track” that
requires the D.C. Circuit to decide the matter within two months.
Prompt resolution would ensure that agencies are able to have
incompetent or malfeasant ALJs removed promptly. Agencies would
retain a right to suspend ALJs immediately when the agency
“considers that action necessary in the interests of national security,”
with limited judicial review.231 Other “interested parties,” as the term
is understood under the APA (§ 554(c)), could also seek ALJs’ removal
or discipline.232 The D.C. Circuit itself would have no power to
discipline or remove an ALJ sua sponte.
By vesting the D.C. Circuit with appointment and removal
power, the D.C. Circuit would become another actor responsible for
227. See GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 9–10 (stating that agencies seek more influence over
selection process, including ability to select candidates with specialized knowledge).
228. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006). My proposal concerns the future appointment of ALJs. As
for current ALJs, I would suggest “grandfathering” them into the new system by permitting the
D.C. Circuit to appoint them summarily. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2006) (prescribing a similar
appointment process for improperly appointed administrative patent judges). This
“grandfathering” would ease the administrative difficulties with appointing so many incumbent
ALJs. But, as with other solutions to prior improper appointments, it would not resolve whether
decisions made prior to D.C. Circuit’s appointment are valid. See id. § 6(d).
229. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006).
230. See infra note 337 and accompanying text. Although the Court in Bowsher v. Synar
suggested that removal under this provision could permit removal for “any number of actual or
perceived transgressions,” 478 U.S. 714, 729 (1986), the Court in Free Enterprise Fund
suggested, without referring to Bowsher, that the provision for removal provided only narrow
grounds for removal, see Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157–58 (2010). These
narrower grounds for removal limit the discretion of the removing party—here the D.C. Circuit—
and thus limit the D.C. Circuit’s control or supervision over the ALJs.
231. See 5 U.S.C. § 7532.
232. Agencies would still decide motions for ALJ bias. See id. § 556(b). If the court became
inundated with frivolous motions from “interested parties” whom the ALJ likely ruled against,
the Court, per statute, could adopt rules that permit single judges to decide whether a complaint
is sufficiently substantial to be referred to a panel for decision. Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 27(c)
(permitting single circuit judge to decide motions).

2b. Barnett_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

2013]

4/23/2013 4:41 PM

RESOLVING THE ALJ QUANDARY

835

ALJs. The D.C. Circuit would replace the MSPB’s role in removing
and disciplining ALJs and the OPM’s and agencies’ role in hiring
ALJs. Nevertheless, the OPM would continue to share responsibilities
concerning increased ALJ pay, temporary assignments, and ensuring
ALJ decisional independence. Indeed, because the AOC, not the OPM,
would assist the D.C. Circuit with ALJ hiring, the OPM should be able
to focus on ALJ performance and decisional independence.233
As discussed below, these changes to ALJ selection will resolve
(or at least substantially mitigate) the appointment, removal, and
impartiality concerns discussed in Part II. Moreover, to Dr. Pangloss’s
relief, this system will also provide a much better world, if not the best
possible one, for ALJs and agencies even if the constitutional concerns
above do not amount to constitutional violations.
B. Clarifying Limits on Interbranch Appointment and Removal
As described below, the D.C. Circuit’s appointment of ALJs is
constitutional and resolves the appointment issue surrounding ALJs.
Depending on whether ALJs are inferior officers or employees, the
Appointments Clause’s text either permits my proposed interbranch
appointment or is otherwise irrelevant. The Supreme Court has,
however, limited Congress’s ability to permit the “Courts of Law” to
appoint executive-branch officers under incongruous-appointment or
separation-of-powers theories. Under these perhaps distinct but
incestuous theories, the appointment must not improperly impede the
functioning of the judicial and executive branches. Congress can very
likely satisfy the inquiry if it vests the D.C. Circuit with the
interbranch appointment of ALJs. As part of my analysis below, I
propose a three-part inquiry to simplify and clarify the Court’s
current, partially redundant, and vague incongruous-appointment
analysis.
1. The Appointments Clause
If ALJs are inferior officers, the Excepting Clause expressly
permits Congress, “as [it] think[s] proper,” to vest their appointment

233. Indeed, because many of the OPM’s and MSPB’s duties would be transferred to the
AOC, federal administrative cost should remain approximately the same. See Krent & DuVall,
supra note 55, at 42 (discussing possible increased administrative costs that may arise from
creating a new independent agency to oversee ALJs). Likewise, the direct judicial decision
concerning ALJ discipline and removal—instead of judicial review of administrative action—
should save administrative costs.
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in “Courts of Law.”234 The D.C. Circuit is a “Court[] of Law,”235 and
thus the Clause’s text expressly permits the D.C. Circuit to appoint
ALJs.
Even if ALJs are instead employees, appointments by the D.C.
Circuit should not offend the Constitution. The Supreme Court has
been clear that the Appointments Clause does not apply to the
appointment of employees and has thus suggested that Congress has
wide latitude in deciding how employees are selected.236 Although
Congress’s power to create interbranch-employee appointments is
unresolved and has been rarely considered,237 Congress can likely
create such appointments, subject at most to the same separation-ofpowers concerns surrounding interbranch-officer appointments.238
After all, even Congress’s enumerated and plenary power to create an
administrative bureaucracy does not permit Congress to act in ways
that trample upon the separation of powers.239 Courts can respect the

234. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
235. See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 888–89 (1991) (holding that “Courts of Law” refer
to legislative and Article III courts); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 678–80 (1988) (assuming
that Special Division, comprised of Article III judges, was a “Court of Law”); Rice v. Ames, 180
U.S. 371, 378 (1901) (holding that Congress could, under the Appointments Clause, vest
appointment in “the [d]istrict or [c]ircuit courts”).
236. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880 (“If we . . . conclude that a special trial judge is only an
employee, petitioners’ challenge fails, for such ‘lesser functionaries’ need not be selected in
compliance with the strict requirements of Article II.”).
237. I have uncovered only two papers that have, in limited fashion, discussed the topic. See
Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power in Political and Corporate Contexts, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
277, 288–89 (2010); Emily E. Eineman, Note, Congressional Criminality and Balance of Powers:
Are Internal Filter Teams Really What Our Forefathers Envisioned?, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
595, 613 (2007). I have uncovered no relevant judicial decisions.
238. The fact that the Constitution provides express authority for only interbranch
appointments of inferior officers, but not employees, should not be troubling. The Excepting
Clause empowers and limits Congress. It allows Congress to use more efficient officerappointment mechanisms, but it requires Congress to appoint officers in a manner expressly
stated in the Appointments Clause. Compare Morrison, 487 U.S. at 673–75, with Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133–36 (1976) (per curiam). The Necessary and Proper Clause should provide
Congress all the authority that it needs to create interbranch-employee appointments when
establishing the administrative state. The separation of powers (but not the Appointments
Clause) provides the proper boundary for those appointments. Cf. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 135–36
(explaining that Necessary and Proper Clause does not permit Congress to ignore other
constitutional limitations). The separation-of-powers concerns should be very similar, if not
identical, for employee and inferior-officer appointments. In both instances, Congress cannot
impair the central functioning of the judicial or executive branch by giving the former the
appointment power. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.
239. See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155–56 (2010) (stating that
Congress must account for presidential oversight in creating a “vast and varied federal
bureaucracy”); Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 316 (2002) (“Congress’s
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separation of powers in evaluating employee-selection schemes in the
same manner as they do in assessing inferior-officer appointments—
that is, by considering the appointment method’s effect on both
judicial and executive integrity, as discussed in Part IV.B.2.
Accordingly, whether ALJs are ultimately deemed employees or
officers, Congress’s interbranch-appointment powers should be
equivalent, and the courts’ inquiry should account for the same
underlying concerns.
2. Doctrinal Incongruity Limitations
Despite the fact that the Appointments Clause does not appear
to forbid interbranch appointments, the Supreme Court has imposed
limits on their use. After a false start in the mid-1800s, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that Congress has substantial discretion in
creating interbranch appointments, so long as the appointment is
neither incongruous nor offensive to the separation of powers. But, as
I discuss below, this “incongruity” limitation is ill defined and
partially redundant.
In 1839, the Court in Ex Parte Hennen appeared to condemn
interbranch appointments. There, the Court upheld a district court’s
appointment of a court clerk.240 Although the case did not involve an
interbranch appointment, the Court stated that “[t]he appointing
power . . . was no doubt intended to be exercised by the department of
the government to which the officer to be appointed most
appropriately belonged.”241
Forty years later, the Court substantially limited Hennen’s
dictum. In Ex Parte Siebold, the Court upheld the judiciary’s
interbranch appointment of election supervisors.242 Although the
Court referred to Hennen in observing that “[i]t is no doubt usual and
proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department
of the government, executive or judicial, or in that particular executive
department to which the duties of such officers appertain,” the Court
also declared that “there is no absolute requirement to this effect in
the Constitution; and, if there were, it would be difficult in many cases
powers are explicitly enumerated, and its powers are further limited through the separation of
powers into three federal branches.”).
240. 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 261–62 (1839).
241. Id. at 257–58. Professor Amar has endorsed the Ex Parte Hennen view, arguing that if
the Founders had sought to permit interbranch appointments, one would have expected
“considerably more discussion” on the topic. Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 747, 808 (1999).
242. 100 U.S. 371, 398–99 (1879).
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to determine to which department an office properly belonged.”243 As a
result, the locus of power to appoint inferior officers rests “in the
discretion
of
Congress,”244
thereby
preventing
“endless
245
controversies.”
Although recognizing Congress’s interbranch-appointment
power, the Supreme Court limited that power by advancing an
ambiguous incongruity principle. The Court first noted that courts in
past cases had properly refused to issue advisory administrative
decisions concerning veterans’ benefits and claims against the U.S.
Army in Florida.246 The Court then stated:
[I]n in the present case there is no such incongruity in the duty required as to excuse the
courts from [appointing inferior officers]. It cannot be affirmed that the appointment of
the officers in question could, with any greater propriety, and certainly not with equal
regard to convenience, have been assigned to any other depositary of official power
capable of exercising it. Neither the President, nor any head of department, could have
been equally competent to the task.247

The Court appears to have meant that an interbranch
appointment will be proper as long as the party defending the
appointment demonstrates that the appointment would (1) not
interfere with the judicial branch’s key function to resolve cases under
Article III and (2) not rest more appropriately in the executive branch
based on some function of propriety, competence, and convenience.248
Siebold’s ambiguity was not lost on scholars or courts. Some
observers suggested that the decision should be limited to the
appointment of congressional-election officers (over which Congress
has distinct powers under Article I)249 or to instances in which the

243. Id. at 397; see also Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 912–14 (D.D.C. 1967) (threejudge panel) (saying in dicta that Siebold contradicts an understanding of Hennen that
proscribes interbranch appointments).
244. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Perhaps the Court intended a narrower limiting principle. The Court speaks of “such
incongruity.” Id. To what does “such” refer? The Court had not previously referred to
“incongruity” in its preceding discussion, but it had referred to the courts’ proper refusal to
provide advisory administrative opinions to the executive branch. Id. The Court then stated that
it had a constitutional duty to appoint inferior officers “when required thereto by law,” and that
“there is no such incongruity in the duty [to appoint.]” Id. Yet if the Court were merely
suggesting that incongruity existed only when the Court was assigned a function that the
Constitution forbade (such as providing advisory opinions), then it is unclear why the Court went
on to discuss the propriety, efficiency, and competency of the appointment.
249. See Wiener, supra note 133, at 425–26.
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President’s central powers were not at issue.250 But others concluded
that Siebold imposed only minor constraints on interbranch
appointments. For instance, a three-judge district court stated in dicta
that the incongruity inquiry does not create “an affirmative
requirement that the duty of the officer be related to the
administration of justice. It is a negative requirement that the duty
may not have ‘such incongruity’ with the judicial function as would
void the power sought to be conferred.”251
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court rejected an
incongruity-based attack but otherwise failed to clarify the doctrine’s
dimensions.252 There, the Court upheld the ability of the Special
Division (a specialized Article III court comprised of Article III judges)
to appoint an independent prosecutor.253 In doing so, the Court held
that Congress had the power to create interbranch appointments,
subject to separation-of-powers and incongruity concerns mentioned in
Siebold.254 The Court suggested that problems would arise if (1) “such
[appointment] had the potential to impair the constitutional functions
assigned to one of the branches,” and (2) incongruity exists between
the courts’ normal functions and their duty to appoint.255 Under this
partially redundant two-part inquiry (because each part looks to the
courts’ functioning), the interbranch appointment of independent
counsel was deemed not incongruous. The Court had earlier permitted
the courts to appoint prosecutors,256 Congress sought to resolve “the
conflicts of interest that could arise in situations when the Executive
Branch is called upon to investigate its own high-ranking officers,”257
and Congress had rendered the appointing judges ineligible to

250. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (“We think it must be incongruous if an officer of one branch is
authorized to appoint an officer of another branch who is assigned a duty central to the
constitutional role of that other branch.”); cf. Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional
Decisionmaking: Politics and the Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1159 (1988)
(contending that Morrison rejected the understanding of the majority in In re Sealed Case).
251. Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 914 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge panel). Judge
Wright, in dissent, took a more expansive view of the incongruity limitation. He disapproved of
the judicial appointments of board-of-education members because such extrajudicial activities
are an “unwanted diversion from what ought to be the judge’s exclusive focus and commitment:
deciding cases.” Id. at 923 (Wright, J., dissenting).
252. 487 U.S. 654, 659–734 (1988).
253. See id.
254. See id. at 673–76.
255. Id. at 676.
256. See id.
257. Id. at 677.
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participate in matters concerning the independent counsel.258 Of
significance for present purposes, the Court’s analysis did not stop
there. It went on to reject an argument that the entire statutory
scheme, including its appointment provision, violated the separation
of powers.259 Morrison is the Court’s last word on interbranch
appointments.260
3. Refining Incongruity Limitations
To bring the Court’s interbranch-appointment-power analysis
into sharper focus, I propose ordering it into three steps. As explained
below, these steps are consistent with interbranch-appointment
decisions and combine Morrison’s overlapping separation-of-powers
and incongruity inquiries into one “incongruity analysis.” The first
step requires determining whether a significant reason for the
interbranch appointment exists. The second step considers whether
the interbranch appointment impedes the central functioning of the
appointing branch, usually the judiciary. And the third step considers
whether the appointment impedes the central function of the
competing branch, usually the executive branch.
The first step asks whether Congress has a significant
justification to create an interbranch appointment, such as
minimizing conflicts of interest in the appointment of a prosecutor to
investigate the executive branch’s high-ranking members.261 This
justification recognizes the Court’s long-standing appreciation for
functional concerns that lead Congress to implement interbranch
appointments.262 At the same time, this inquiry can help to ensure
258. See id.
259. See id. at 685–96.
260. See Samahon, supra note 54, at 258–66. Professor Tuan Samahon has argued that if
the Court’s decision in Edmond v. United States overruled Morrison’s test for determining who
are inferior officers, “[i]t precludes interbranch appointments pursuant to the Excepting Clause”
because usually officers are subordinate to those who appoint them. See id. at 267. Samahon
recognizes, however, that lower courts have continued to reconcile Edmond and Morrison. See id.
at 258–64. Moreover, lower courts since Edmond have affirmed Congress’s power to create
interbranch appointments. See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000); United
States v. Moreau, CR 07-0388 JB, 2008 WL 4104131, at *38–39 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008).
261. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677. Another significant justification, as mentioned in Ex
Parte Siebold, is that difficulty of telling whether a certain inferior officer rests within a
particular branch. See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879). But such ambiguity, while
sufficient, is not necessary because federal courts have upheld the interbranch appointments of
U.S. Attorneys and independent counsel, who are plainly executive officers.
262. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677 (considering Congress’s interest in intrabranch conflicts
of interest); Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397 (considering convenience of interbranch appointment and
the appointing branch’s competence to appoint).
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that Congress is not unnecessarily deviating from the general “law or
rule” in Hennen and Siebold that Congress should vest the
appointment of an inferior officer within the “department of
government to which the official to be appointed most appropriately
belonged.”263 For instance, Congress would not appear to have a
significant reason for permitting courts to appoint deputy agency
heads because they are policymakers for which no conflicts of interest
are readily apparent.
A significant justification, however, does not mean a
necessity.264 Such a strict requirement would deprive Congress of the
substantial discretion it has to decide how the appointment power
should be distributed “as [it] think[s] proper” under the Excepting
Clause.265 Indeed, if necessity were required, then the Court should
not have approved the interbranch appointments of commissioners in
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States,266 prosecutors in contempt
proceedings in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,267 or
election supervisors in Siebold.268 In short, requiring necessity would
substantially limit Congress’s discretion that the Constitution
expressly grants. Asking whether a significant reason undergirds an
interbranch appointment, along with the other two steps, should
ensure that Congress uses its interbranch-appointment-vesting
discretion thoughtfully, not as a weapon to wound one of the other
branches or to aggrandize its own power. Although the “significant
justification” inquiry admittedly suffers from indefiniteness,269
263. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397 (quoting Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 258 (1839)).
In a decision concerning only the separation-of-powers context (and not appointments), the Court
spoke similarly, refusing to permit “the Judicial Branch . . . [to] be assigned [or] allowed ‘tasks
that are more properly accomplished by [other] branches.’ ” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 383 (1989).
264. See Moreau, 2008 WL 4104131, at *35 (rejecting any necessity requirement). But see
Wiener, supra note 133, at 432 (suggesting that interbranch appointment of independent counsel
was permissible because “[t]he raison d’être of the Independent Counsel was to create an officer
not appointed by the executive branch”).
265. See Moreau, 2008 WL 4104131, at *35 (highlighting Congress’s broad direction to vest
appointment power under the Excepting Clause).
266. 282 U.S. 344, 354 (1931).
267. 481 U.S. 787, 800 (1987).
268. Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397.
269. See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85
CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1997) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should create a methodology to
provide guidance on which purposes will be deemed “compelling” or “important” in tieredscrutiny analysis). I have purposefully not used the terms “compelling,” “important,” or
“legitimate” to describe the adequate justification; the incongruity analysis might
unintentionally acquire the patina of the Court’s tiered-scrutiny, equal-protection analysis. See
id. at 306.
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limiting acceptable justifications for interbranch appointments to
mitigating structural concerns (such as with ALJs) or ambiguities over
the branch to which an inferior officer should be assigned (such as
with federal marshals) is a reasonable place to start. A significantjustification inquiry strikes the appropriate balance of respecting
Congress’s prerogative while ensuring that Congress does not abuse
its discretion.270
The second and third steps relate to one another and ask
whether the interbranch appointment undermines the central
functioning of either the judicial or executive branches.271 In Morrison,
the Court posed the question whether the interbranch appointment
has the “potential to impair the constitutional functions assigned to
one of the branches.”272 This seemingly general separation-of-powers
inquiry has a specialized cast in the interbranch-appointment context,
which generally concerns the relationship between the judicial and
executive branches.273
270. Compare United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) (“It is not for the
courts to determine the best or most efficient repository for a power of appointment vis-à-vis
inferior officers. . . . Congress’s choice always deserves appreciable deference.”) (citing Siebold,
100 U.S. at 397–98), and Moreau, 2008 WL 4104131, at *37 (stating that the Constitution grants
Congress “considerable discretion”), with Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991)
(suggesting that Congress is entitled to less deference when an interbranch appointment is at
issue), and Ronald J. Krotoszynski, On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and Morrison
Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 421–23, 476–78 (1997) (arguing that redistributions of
powers between the judicial branch and the other branches, as opposed to redistributions
between the executive and legislative branches, are more suspect because judges are not
politically accountable). Notably, Congress has not appeared to abuse its interbranchappointment authority. Congress currently permits only one interbranch appointment: the
district courts’ appointment of U.S. Attorneys in very limited circumstances. See Moreau, 2008
WL 4104131, at *8 (quoting Wiener, supra note 133, at 363).
271. Many have criticized the central or “core executive” function inquiry from Morrison.
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 559–60 (1994); Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Independent Counsel
Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105, 105–07 (1988). My purpose here is not to propose an inquiry that is
contrary to Supreme Court precedent; my goal is merely to refine it. Those who do not approve of
Morrison’s formulation should rest easy with its application here. The Supreme Court has, so far,
not again uttered or applied the standard, including in Free Enterprise Fund, suggesting that the
Morrison standard, if not abrogated, may be best understood as limited to the interbranchappointment context.
272. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677; see also id. at 684 (asking whether the Ethics in
Government Act threatens “the ‘impartial and independent federal adjudication of claims within
the judicial power of the United States’ ” (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986))).
273. Other interbranch-appointment combinations are possible. For instance, the judiciary
appoints (and removes) Article I bankruptcy judges, who are members of the legislative branch.
See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2626–27 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). But the
interbranch nature of the appointment may be less troubling because the legislature cannot
appoint under the Appointments Clause.
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This inquiry ensures that, even with a significant purpose, an
interbranch appointment does not impede the central functioning of
the executive or judicial branches. After all if an interbranch
appointment, whatever its purposes, greatly impedes one of the
affected branches, the appointment may be unsuitable. For instance,
after the scandal concerning the forced resignations and removals of
U.S. Attorneys during the George W. Bush Administration,274
Congress could decide that the courts, rather than the executive
branch, would be better stewards of the appointment and removal
powers concerning these “ministers of justice.” Despite Congress’s
attempt to remedy a potentially serious structural problem,
transferring to the courts the full-time duty to appoint and remove
U.S. Attorneys would likely impede the central functioning of the
executive branch—to set prosecutorial policy throughout the country—
by hindering presidential control over an important executive function
in all districts in the United States. And the U.S. Attorneys’
appointment and removal by the courts could impede the central
functioning of the judicial branch by bogging it down in ongoing
political battles over law-enforcement policies and personnel.
Although the existing, default appointment and removal scheme for
U.S. Attorneys may present structural challenges, an interbranch
appointment would likely be more problematic by impeding the
central functioning of two branches. In other words, these final steps
ensure that Congress doesn’t choose a cure that is worse than the
disease.
By engaging in this three-part inquiry, courts can simplify the
currently amorphous and redundant separation-of-powers and
incongruity analyses. The Court’s interbranch-appointment and
separation-of-powers analyses consider both the appointing and the
affected branches, but in confusing and redundant ways.275 My
274. See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales: “Mistakes Were Made,” WASH. POST (Mar.
14, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/13/AR2007031300776
_pf.html.
275. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676. The Court’s separation of powers inquiry is at least
partially redundant with the interbranch-appointment inquiry. The latter considers the effect of
the appointment on both the appointing and nonappointing branches, and the former considers
the effect of an appointment on either the nonappointing branch or both the nonappointing and
appointing branches. Compare Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675 (referring to separation of powers as an
“addition[al]” issue to incongruity and suggesting that separation of powers focuses only on the
nonappointing branch), with Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 385, 389 (1989)
(considering both the affected branch and the appointing branch for its separation-of-powers
analysis). Thus, under either separation-of-powers formulation, the two inquiries overlap at least
in part. See Wiener, supra note 133, at 436 & n.338; see also United States v. Moreau, No. CR 070388, 2008 WL 4104131, at *17 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008).
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proposed three-part inquiry, following recent lower-court opinions,
avoids these problems by considering the effect on both branches as
part of a compressed incongruity analysis.276
C. Propriety of Interbranch Appointments of ALJs
Interbranch appointments of ALJs should be deemed proper
under the refined incongruity limits. Not only does a significant
reason for the interbranch appointment of ALJs exist, but the D.C.
Circuit’s appointments of them will not impede the central functioning
of either the judiciary or the executive branch.
1. Significant Purpose for Interbranch Appointment of ALJs
As to the first of the three inquiries, a significant justification
supports the interbranch appointment of ALJs: the resolution or
mitigation of the ALJ separation-of-powers quandary. Vesting the
D.C. Circuit with the power to appoint ALJs remedies the existing
Appointments Clause problem by channeling ALJ appointments, in
keeping with its text, to “Courts of Law.”277 And an interbranch
appointment remedies, in perhaps an unconventional way, the
existing concerns as to the proper balance of executive supervision and
ALJ impartiality.
a. Mitigating Presidential-Control Concerns
With the appointment power in the D.C. Circuit’s hands, the
President loses any constitutional power he may have had to remove
ALJs. This counterintuitive effect arises because the power to remove
is incident to the power to appoint, unless Congress has placed the
removal power elsewhere.278 Courts have consistently applied this
276. See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 26–29 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting challenge to
judicial appointment of U.S. Attorneys in a combined incongruity and separation-of-powers
analysis); see also In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, R.B., J.,
dissenting), rev’d sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (“An inter-branch
appointment would indeed fail the test of congruity if it violated the separation of powers
doctrine.”).
277. Resolving an appointments concern alone is not a significant reason for an interbranch
appointment. Were it otherwise, Congress’s power to create interbranch appointments would be
essentially unlimited.
278. See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010); Burnap v. United
States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) (“The power to remove is, in the absence of statutory provision
to the contrary, an incident of the power to appoint.”); In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 259–
60 (1839) (noting that officers serve at the discretion of the appointing power).
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principle in the intrabranch-appointment context, albeit without
significant discussion of the interbranch nature of the appointment
and principally in the context of interbranch appointments of Article I
or Article IV inferior officers.279 And, indeed, the judiciary currently
has the incidental, interbranch-removal power over Article I
bankruptcy judges.280 To be sure, in the context of judicial interbranch
appointments of Article II inferior officers, courts have stressed the
executive branch’s ability to remove prosecutors whom courts had
appointed.281 But courts have never held that the executive branch
must have the power to remove those officials, much less have the
same kind of supervisory power over officials who exercise only
impartial, adjudicatory powers.282
Nor should courts impose any such limit by relying on Free
Enterprise Fund. If the President or agency head permissibly lacks
removal power, Free Enterprise Fund’s ambiguous limitation on
tiered-tenure protections becomes inapposite by its own terms. That
decision invalidated one of two tenure protections that limited the
executive branch’s implied removal power. Here, only one tier of
tenure protection exists between the D.C. Circuit and ALJs, leaving
279. See Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 424 (1901) (considering commissioners (i.e.,
justices of the peace in Indian Territory) appointed by judges); Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp.
902, 913 n.13 (D.D.C. 1967) (citing In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 257–58 (1839))
(considering appointment of D.C. school-board members); cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 354 & n.2 (1931) (upholding interbranch appointment of commissioners,
with mostly judicial and some executive functions, and indicating that they were subordinate to
appointing judges). The court likewise suggested the same incidental removal power exists with
the appointment of executive-branch inferior officers, such as perhaps ALJs. Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, 126 (1926) (“[T]he power of appointment to executive office carries with it, as
a necessary incident, the power of removal.” (emphasis added)); see id. at 161 (same for “inferior
executive officers”).
280. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006). To be precise, Congress has authorized the Judicial
Councils—composed of Article III district and circuit judges—within each circuit to remove
bankruptcy judges. The circuit courts themselves have only the appointment power under § 152.
281. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682–83 (1988) (deciding whether judicial
power to remove an executive officer infringed upon the executive branch); Hilario, 218 F.3d at
27 (noting judges cannot remove interim United States Attorneys they appoint); United States v.
Moreau, CR 07-0388, 2008 WL 4104131, at *38–39 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008) (same).
282. Although Morrison relied upon the Attorney General’s “most important[]” removal
authority over independent counsel, see 487 U.S. at 696, the Court never said that such power
was required. Professor Krent argues that Morrison determined that “some form of removal
authority was constitutionally required.” Harold J. Krent, Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors:
The Ramifications of Free Enterprise Fund, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2436 (2011) (referring to
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695–96). His inference is reasonable but not compelled. In light of the
Court’s consistent treatment of the removal power as incident to the appointment power and the
meaningfully different functions of various inferior officers, a more limited interpretation of
Morrison makes more sense if, as I attempt to do here, one seeks to reconcile the Court’s
Appointments Clause jurisprudence.
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the President no implied removal power. Thus Free Enterprise’s
holding does not apply. Vesting the removal power within the D.C.
Circuit is a constitutional means of avoiding Free Enterprise Fund’s
holding that applies to tiered-tenure protections within the executive
branch.283
Even if Free Enterprise Fund is understood to stand more
broadly for strongly endorsing or generally requiring the President’s
power to remove executive officers, the rationale in Free Enterprise
Fund does not extend to ALJs. The Court stated that the removal
power ensures that the President has the power to supervise
unelected subordinates, not merely to persuade them “to do what they
ought to do without persuasion.”284 But, when the government is a
party to what is meant to be an impartial formal proceeding, the ALJ,
as an impartial decisionmaker, should not decide in the government’s
favor unless the government persuades it to do so. A contrary result—
that the President can obtain a desired result from an ALJ without
persuasion—would lead to significant due process concerns and
undermine the very purpose of ALJs. In fact, the Court in Wiener v.
United States upheld implicit limits on the President’s removal power
over adjudicators by relying on Congress’s ability to render
adjudicators “entirely free from the control or coercive influence, direct
or indirect”285 and, as the Court said that it took for granted, the
President’s inability to interfere with any specific adjudication.286 In
short, although the President may not have to persuade an agency to
implement a certain policy, he (or an agency) must do just that—
under the APA and under the U.S. Constitution—during formal
administrative adjudication. The Court’s doctrine supports this
normative view grounded in due process. Whereas removal may be a

283. ALJs do not morph into principal officers if the D.C. Circuit, as opposed to an agency
head, can remove them. The Court in Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997), said,
“ ‘[I]nferior officers’ are officers whose work is directed and supervised at some level by others
who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The
judges of the D.C. Circuit, who received presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation, can
remove ALJs under limited circumstances. And agency heads, who (in probably every case) were
also similarly nominated and confirmed, can reverse ALJs’ decisions as to fact and law. Cf.
Amar, supra note 241, at 807 (contending that subordination, not removability, is the relevant
inquiry for inferior-officer status). The court’s significant, but limited, removal power and agency
heads’ substantial supervision over ALJ decisionmaking would render ALJs no more than
inferior officers.
284. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 (2010).
285. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1958) (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
286. Id. at 356.
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necessary tool for presidential supervision over policymakers,287 it
should not be necessary for presidential supervision of impartial
adjudicators appointed by another branch.288
Finally, the lack of one form of presidential control—the
removal power—should not be troubling, given the other forms of
executive supervision and direction.289 The executive branch, after all,
retains a prominent place in the removal decisionmaking process
because agencies can initiate ALJ-removal proceedings. Thus, unlike
the proposal that granted ALJs Article III protections, my proposal
does not suffer the infirmity of completely denuding the executive
branch from the removal of an executive officer. As explained in Part
IV.E, the President retains tools aside from initiating removal
proceedings to have sufficient supervisory authority over ALJs’ policy
decisions.290
b. Mitigating Impartiality Concerns
Judicial appointment and removal cures or mitigates the ALJ
impartiality concerns, including the concerns that arise from
Caperton. Because the agency is no longer “choos[ing] the judge in [its]
287. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3159 (“The Commission cannot wield a free hand to
supervise individual members if it must destroy the Board in order to fix it.”).
288. But see Jeffrey A. Wertkin, A Return to First Principles: Rethinking ALJ Compromises,
22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 365, 401 (2002) (stating prior to Free Enterprise Fund that
“after-the-fact correction of a single decision supplies insufficient control”). I distinguish between
those that perform only adjudicative functions, such as ALJs, and those who sometimes (or, at
least, are permitted to) promulgate rules, such as agency heads. An interbranch appointment
and an incidental removal of policymakers create more troubling separation-of-powers concerns
for both the executive and judicial branches. See infra Part IV.D–E.
289. Professor Jonathan Entin has concluded that the removal power has limited actual
significance, but its rhetoric and the Court’s holdings have significant symbolic consequences.
Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and the Presidency: The Removal Power as Symbol, 47 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 1595, 1602–03 (1997). Perhaps, then, the Court’s formal focus on the removal power,
as opposed to other forms of administrative control or independence, has assumed inflated
importance. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through
Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 30 (2010) (arguing that scholars should focus on
practical limitations on agency independence). A functional approach to executive control that
looks beyond the removal power makes the most sense in cases, such as with ALJs, where the
removal power creates other constitutional tensions.
290. My proposal may not satisfy unitary executive theorists because the President cannot
remove ALJs. But those theorists’ dissatisfaction would transcend my particular proposal and
extend to the Court’s removal-powers doctrine and any limits arising from due process. This
doctrine has already tacitly approved of the interbranch-removal power, see supra note 279, and
significantly limited presidential removal power, see generally Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at
3138. My purpose here is to provide a workable solution that accounts for both normative and
doctrinal problems, not to challenge or provide a new normative theory of the President’s
supervisory powers.
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own cause,”291 any “probability of unfairness”292 or “unconstitutional
‘potential for bias’ ” should not exist under Caperton’s standard.293 The
D.C. Circuit can also help ensure that the ALJs have a broad array of
experiences within and outside the agency and thereby reduce the
likelihood that ALJs come from the farm team that is the agency’s
enforcement division with undue sympathy for agency-enforcement,
especially highly partisan policy, positions. The D.C. Circuit, with
careful consideration of an agency’s needs, will likely be more
concerned than a selecting agency with indicia of a candidate’s
impartiality. As with the transfer of removal power to the D.C.
Circuit, the transfer of appointing power enhances, at the very least,
the perception of fairness. And, as Caperton makes clear, perceptions
concerning impartiality matter.294
Likewise, by placing the removal decision in another branch,
those appearing before ALJs will feel more confident that the
executive branch—whether in the form of the President, the agency,
or any other executive actor—is not directing the actions of a
marionette ALJ, especially in cases in which credibility is key and an
ALJ’s decision receives increased deference.295 That the President’s
and agency’s actual removal power is currently very limited is largely
beside the point. The perception that the President and agency have
more control over ALJs than impartial courts is a powerful force that
creates the appearance of unfairness that appears to drive, as
Caperton makes clear, the Supreme Court’s due process inquiry.
Vesting the removal power in the D.C. Circuit largely mitigates the
appearance of improper agency control over ALJs.296
In short, an interbranch-appointment mechanism serves a
significant purpose: it resolves, or at least substantially mitigates, the
appointment, removal, and impartiality concerns that now surround

291. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009).
292. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136
(1955)).
293. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 465–66
(1971)).
294. See id. at 888–89 (noting that state recusal requirements for appearance of impropriety
will limit due process challenges).
295. See Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 29–33 (explaining agency’s deference to ALJ
credibility determinations); Timony, supra note 2, at 811–12 & nn.28–29 (same); supra notes 49–
50 and accompanying text (same).
296. This Article does not consider whether, aside from impartiality, the ability of the
executive branch to overrule an ALJ decision creates a due process problem. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951) (instructing lower
courts to defer to agency, as opposed to ALJ, decisions), strongly suggests not.
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ALJs. And it does so better than other appointment solutions under
the Excepting Clause by way of a simple transfer of duties. For
instance, if the President alone or a nonindependent executive
department appointed and removed ALJs, the ALJ would have only
one tier of tenure protection, and that good cause tenure protection
would provide the removing executive party with significant
discretion.297 Vesting the same powers in a new or current
independent department (whose members, because of their
independence, the President could remove only for cause) would then,
as now, leave the President’s removal power in jeopardy because two
tiers of tenure protection would exist between the President and the
ALJs. The competing concerns underlying ALJs’ place in the federal
bureaucracy render an interbranch appointment appropriate and
demonstrate that the executive branch is not an equally, much less a
more, appropriate repository of the appointment (and thus the
incidental removal) power.298
2. Judicious Appointments
Congress can use an interbranch appointment to end ALJs’
separation-of-powers quandary without impeding the central
functioning of the judicial branch. Article II expressly gives the courts
of law, if they have Congress’s blessing, the power to appoint inferior
officers.299 The courts routinely appoint officials with solely
adjudicatory powers—magistrate judges, special masters, and
bankruptcy judges, for instance.300 Indeed, the courts of appeals
themselves appoint (and have the power to remove) bankruptcy judges
for their respective circuits, and this appointment qualifies as
297. The default appointment mechanism of nomination and confirmation would likely
provide ALJs additional authority within the federal bureaucracy. See Nina A. Mendelson,
Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority Over Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV.
2455, 2478 (2011) (emphasizing the importance of Senate-confirmed appointments to agency
authority). But such an appointment for ALJs would leave the removal power with the
President, see Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119, 162 (1926) (recognizing the President’s
incidental removal power), and thus not eradicate impartiality concerns. Thus, even if Congress
could only use an interbranch appointment when a default appointment was less suitable, an
interbranch appointment for ALJs would be permissible because it provides a more
comprehensive remedy for concerns surrounding ALJs. Moreover, traditional appointment of
sixteen hundred ALJs would be an onerous mode of appointment.
298. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989) (explaining that the court
should not perform tasks better suited to other branches); Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397
(1879) (explaining the court’s appointment power under Article II).
299. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
300. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 631 (2006) (authorizing court appointment of bankruptcy and
magistrate judges, respectively).
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interbranch because bankruptcy judges are Article I judges.301 ALJs
also adjudicate, albeit in cases in which their decisions advance the
policies of an agency, as opposed to those of Congress, the federal
common law, or the Constitution.302 Accordingly, granting the D.C.
Circuit power to appoint adjudicators generally, by itself, almost
certainly does not impede the central functioning of the judicial
branch—that is, to decide disputes.
ALJs’ status as executive, as opposed to judicial, officers does
not alter this conclusion. The Supreme Court has never invalidated an
interbranch appointment; therefore, which appointments are
inappropriate is generally unknown. But one recognized possibility is
that an interbranch appointment is inappropriate when it “thrust[s]
courts into partisan, political battles.”303 Whatever fears may exist
when the judiciary appoints independent counsel, interim U.S.
Attorneys, or other executive inferior officers should be absent for
judicial appointment of ALJs. ALJs are meant to be neutrals who do
not create or advocate particular policies, much less those identified
with certain political parties. Indeed, if ALJ selection is currently
partisan, vesting the appointment power in the D.C. Circuit should
mitigate the partisanship because the D.C. Circuit, like other courts,
routinely selects impartial adjudicators from a candidate pool.
Because agencies themselves continue to have the power to set policy,
the courts would not select policymakers. Instead, they would appoint
those who have a duty to find facts and apply the agency’s regulations
and organic acts to disputes before them. This is, at the very least, a
quasi-judicial function that judges understand and can determine with
no less competence than agencies.304

301. See 28 U.S.C. § 152 (conferring authority on U.S. courts of appeals to appoint
bankruptcy judges); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011) (holding that bankruptcy
courts are not “adjuncts of Article III courts”); id. at 2624 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
302. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513–14 (1978) (stating that ALJs were
“functionally comparable” to judges); Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1209 (noting that ALJs do not
overrule the actions of the two elected branches).
303. Wiener, supra note 133, at 426; see Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (arguing that
appointment of independent counsel “risks politicizing the judiciary”); Wiener, supra note 133, at
430–31 (arguing against the judicial appointment of U.S. Attorneys for this reason). But compare
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (“We do not believe . . . that the significantly
political nature of the [U.S. Sentencing] Commission’s work renders unconstitutional its
placement within the Judicial Branch.”), with id. at 396 (“Nor do the [Sentencing] Guidelines . . .
involve a degree of political authority inappropriate for a nonpolitical Branch.”).
304. See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396 (“This is not a case in which judges are given power
. . . in an area in which they have no special knowledge or expertise.” (quoting Morrison v. Olson,
487 U.S. 654, 676 n.13 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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The D.C. Circuit’s ability to receive comments from interested
parties helps assuage fears of partisanship and inadequate
information.305 Controversy arose when a judge on the Special
Division discussed who should serve as independent counsel in the
Whitewater Matter with Republican senators.306 As Professor Ronald
Krotoszynski has suggested, a public notice-and-comment period
would allow judges to obtain advice from numerous interested parties
without resorting to ex parte contacts that could easily create the
appearance of partisan appointments.307 These comments would be
much like amicus briefs with which the D.C. Circuit is all too familiar.
Receiving comments—publicly filed briefs, of sorts, from interested
persons—helps “maintain[] the dignity of Article III courts”308 by
allowing them to decide in a manner that is both familiar and
transparent.
Likewise, ALJs’ status as executive officers does not
meaningfully distinguish them from the other adjudicators (i.e.,
bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges) whom appellate courts
currently appoint for purposes of the Exceptions Clause. Bankruptcy
judges are Article I judges, and magistrates are Article III inferior
officers. Unlike ALJs, who are executive officers, these other
adjudicators cannot be reversed by the executive branch. But the
executive branch’s ability to reverse an ALJ’s decision should not be
troubling because that branch has the same or greater power over
other executive officials occasionally appointed by the judiciary (such
as U.S. Attorneys).
The fact that ALJs, even if executive officers, are not also
officers of an Article III court is relevant, but not dispositive. Courts
have found it relevant, for instance, that prosecutors are not only
executive officers, but also officers of the court.309 Yet, ALJs’ lack of a
dual-officer capacity does not mean that interbranch appointment of
305. See Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (“Judges will not be good at picking prosecutors
because they have inadequate information and weak incentives.”); Krent & DuVall, supra note
55, at 42 (arguing that those outside of an ALJ’s agency lack familiarity with that agency’s
“law”).
306. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (mentioning the “partisan bickering” resulting
from the judge’s meeting); Krotoszynski, supra note 270, at 447–55 (discussing Starr’s
appointment and subsequent challenge to Judge Sentelle’s ex parte meeting).
307. Krotoszynski, supra note 270, at 474.
308. Id. at 475.
309. See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) (describing dual role of U.S.
Attorneys as officers of the court); cf. Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879) (describing dual
role of federal marshals). But see United States v. Moreau, No. CR 07-0388 JB, 2008 WL
4104131, at *38 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008) (“[An appointed U.S. Attorney] is not part of the judiciary,
nor has he ever been.”).
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ALJs is improper. Unlike prosecutors, who exercise purely executive
functions (even when serving as officers of the court), ALJs exercise
only adjudicative functions, and the courts routinely review their
decisions. Courts’ and ALJs’ shared function gives the former the
competence to appoint the latter. In other words, the ALJs’ similar
function to courts more than compensates for ALJs’ lack of dual-officer
status within two branches.
Perhaps, however, appointing a large cadre of ALJs would
require the D.C. Circuit to forsake its central function of deciding
cases. After all, the appointment of an independent counsel, election
supervisors, U.S. Attorneys, or even bankruptcy judges is a relatively
rare event.310 In contrast, the federal administrative state has more
than sixteen hundred ALJs. The large number of ALJs (almost double
the 874 Article III judgeships311) creates the possibility that
appointing ALJs, not deciding cases, will become a full-time job for the
D.C. Circuit judges.
Yet, Congress can mollify this legitimate concern. The average
annual number of ALJ appointments will likely rest around fiftysix,312 certainly more than other interbranch appointments, but still a
manageable number. Congress can largely mitigate any burden on the
D.C. Circuit by permitting it to appoint ALJs in three-judge panels.313
Assuming that the Court has nine active judges (and may have up to
eleven active judges),314 the Court could establish at least three panels
for each year, with each panel appointing approximately nineteen
310. For instance, the D.C. Circuit is charged with appointing only one bankruptcy judge to
a fourteen-year term. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1)–(2) (2006). Even the elephantine Ninth Circuit must
appoint only sixty-eight bankruptcy judges to fourteen-year terms. See id. (listing the number of
judges each individual district must appoint). And the district courts can appoint a U.S. Attorney
only if political-appointment mechanisms have failed. See Wiener, supra note 133, at 366
(explaining the appointment process).
311. See Federal Judgeships, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/
FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (listing 874 total Article III judgeships).
312. Although I was unable to find any statistics concerning the average ALJ tenure, the
GAO has reported that “the ALJ program has experienced a low annual retirement rate, ranging
from 2 to 5 percent from 2002 through 2006.” GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 13. For ease of
discussion, I have estimated a retirement rate of 3.5 percent and applied that to the number of
ALJs provided in Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund, rounded up to the nearest
hundred (sixteen hundred). See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3213 app. C (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“According to data provided by the Office of Personnel Management,
reprinted below, there are 1,584 administrative law judges (ALJs) in the Federal Government.”).
313. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (permitting three-judge panels to decide cases).
314. 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (permitting eleven judges on the D.C. Circuit). For ease of discussion,
I rely on the assumption that the D.C. Circuit will have at least nine active judges because the
D.C. Circuit had nine judges during the time period relevant for the data underlying the 2010
judge-to-decision ratio.
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ALJs per year (or fewer if senior judges are permitted and willing to
assist their active colleagues on additional panels).315 If each
appointment is treated like a decision on the merits by each judge on
the panel (meaning that each appointment is weighed more heavily
than decisions on the merits because each appointment “counts” three
times, one for each judge), participating in nineteen appointment
decisions increases each active D.C. Circuit judge’s judge-to-meritsdecision ratio, based on data from 2010, from 1:173 to 1:192. This ratio
is still significantly below the same ratio for other courts with
relatively light caseloads (e.g., 1:242 for the Tenth Circuit, 1:293 for
the Sixth Circuit, 1:319 for the Seventh Circuit, and 1:415 for the First
Circuit) and the national ratio of 1:459.316 Because the D.C. Circuit
would continue to have the lightest caseload of all federal circuits even
when appointing ALJs, any argument that the appointing of ALJs will
improperly burden the D.C. Circuit “from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions”317 is difficult to accept.
Even if one disagrees with my educated guess over the number
of appointments or its burden on the D.C. Circuit, other remedies exist
for managing the number of appointments. Perhaps if ALJs reduce
their average tenure or if agencies need a greater number of ALJs, my
suggested average annual number of fifty-six ALJ appointments may
be too low. Or appointing ALJs may be unduly burdensome merely
because appointing would now potentially constitute approximately
eleven percent of each active D.C. Circuit judge’s duties or because the
D.C. Circuit’s docket is more time consuming and complex than I
expect. If these objections turn out to be well founded, relatively
315. The D.C. Circuit has several senior judges. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS: D.C. CIRCUIT,
http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (click on “Judges” tab to see listing of
judges). If three agreed to assist with ALJ appointments and thereby create a fourth panel, each
panel would appoint approximately fourteen ALJs per year.
316. See supra note 223 (documenting the caseloads of the U.S. Courts of Appeals). The AOC
has released similar data from 2011, but this more recent data does not vary materially from the
2010 data and thus does not alter my conclusions above. U.S. Court of Appeals—Judicial
Caseload Profile, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/
FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2011/Appeals_FCMS_Profiles_December_2011.pdf&page=3
(last visited Jan. 23, 2013). For instance, although the 2011 relevant ratio for the D.C. Circuit
increases from 1:173 to 1:203 (based largely on the court having one fewer judge), the national
ratio increases by an even greater degree from 1:459 to 1:496.
317. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989) (quoting Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). Similarly, the AOC’s assistance to the D.C. Circuit should not
be problematic. The Supreme Court has already indicated its support of the AOC’s existence and
“myriad responsibilities.” Id. at 388–89. Indeed, the AOC’s duties in administering the ALJ
examination, compiling the agency and third-party comments, and otherwise assisting the D.C.
Circuit ensure that the judges’ appointing of ALJs does not interfere with their central function
of deciding cases.
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simple solutions exist. Congress could allow three-judge panels within
all of the federal circuit courts to appoint ALJs and rotate the
appointing duty among the active judges of the circuits in random
order, based on either each circuit’s caseload or the number of ALJs
working within each circuit, as determined by the AOC. Although I
have proposed turning to the D.C. Circuit based on its administrative
law expertise, its location, and its light caseload, diluting the
appointing burden throughout all of the federal circuit courts is
another way of achieving the benefits of an interbranch appointment
without improperly impeding the D.C. Circuit or other “Court of
Law’s” judicial function.318
Finally, that the D.C. Circuit may review the decisions from
ALJs that they have appointed is a virtue, not a vice. Some litigants
and scholars have argued that an interbranch appointment is
improper when a court sits in judgment of decisions by those it
appoints, such as prosecutors. The appointment becomes improper,
the argument goes, because the judiciary forsakes its appearance of
impartiality.319 But this argument proves too much. Judges decide or
review cases in which they have selected, for instance, defense counsel
for the indigent, bankruptcy judges, magistrates, and special masters
(all of whom could be the judges’ former law clerks) without
impugning their impartiality.320 Therefore, it is difficult to see why
their review of a decision by an ALJ—chosen for his or her ability to
be impartial, not for particular policy preferences that the agency can
reverse—would be problematic, especially when the APA requires the
court to review the decision of the agency, not the ALJ.321 Indeed, the
D.C. Circuit’s awareness that it may have to review decisions from the
318. The appointing judges are not likely to identify themselves as managers or employers,
as opposed to adjudicators (and thereby undermine their judicial function). No such
identification has been alleged to occur, despite judicial appointment of numerous other officials,
including prosecutors, public defenders, bankruptcy judges, magistrate judges, mediators, and
various clerks of court.
319. See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2000) (conceding judicial
appointment of prosecutors could adversely affect the court’s impartiality); United States v.
Moreau, No. CR 07-0388 JB, 2008 WL 4104131, at *38 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008) (examining
possibility that such appointments could diminish the integrity of the courts); Wiener, supra note
133, at 431–32 (arguing judges lack impartiality and the prosecutors they appoint lack
accountability). The Morrison Court also noted that the Special Division’s members lacked the
ability to participate in any proceedings concerning the independent counsel that they had
nominated. 487 U.S. 654, 683–84 (1988). But ALJs’ limited ability to make final policy
determinations, nonpolitical role, and independence from the judiciary (which cannot set its
jurisdiction or refer matters to the ALJ, as in Morrison) should mitigate any concern that may
arise from the D.C. Circuit’s review of ALJ decisions.
320. See, e.g., Hilario, 218 F.3d at 29 (referring to appointment of defense counsel).
321. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006).
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ALJ may help provide the D.C. Circuit incentive to appoint the best
candidates.322
3. Improved Functioning of the Executive Branch
Despite the executive branch’s loss of power to appoint and
remove ALJs, interbranch appointment and removal do not impede
that branch’s central functioning.323 First and foremost, agency heads
continue to have the power to reverse an ALJ decision under the APA
and thus control federal administrative policy.324 Agencies, too,
continue to have discretion over matters concerning ALJs under my
proposal. For instance, not only do they continue to decide the number
of ALJs needed to carry out agency missions,325 but they also can
comment on ALJ candidates and submit their own candidates for
judicial consideration.326 Indeed, the proposed “Rule of Three or Four,”
unlike the current “Rule of Three,” acts as a suitable substitute for
selective certification by permitting the agency to ensure, especially if
the “Veterans’ Preference” leads to three candidates without sufficient
expertise, that at least one candidate has certain necessary

322. See Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (arguing that judges lack incentive to make excellent
interbranch appointments). Admittedly, the possibility of the D.C. Circuit reviewing a particular
ALJ’s decision is slight; the other circuits review numerous administrative orders. Yet, the D.C.
Circuit is likely to be sufficiently considerate to its sister courts to try to appoint impartial, welltrained ALJs.
323. See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 494–95 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d sub nom. Morrison
v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (asking whether appointment undermines the President’s ability to
make policy choices); see also Blumoff, supra note 250, at 1160–61:
The requirement of some congruity also undermined the Sealed Case court’s ‘Chicken
Little’ concern [that a limited incongruity principle would essentially permit the court
to appoint all inferior officers if Congress sought to impede the executive’s
prerogative] . . . . The Supreme Court noted that Congress could make no such
delegation when the courts lacked special competence of the subject matter.
324. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 495 (1951). The
Supreme Court in Bowsher stated that “[o]nce an officer is appointed, it is only the authority that
can remove him . . . that he must fear and, in the performance of his functions, obey.” Bowsher v.
United States, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986). This formulation is not entirely accurate in the
interbranch-removal context of ALJs. ALJs will fear the D.C. Circuit judges, who can remove
them under a heightened tenure-protection provision. But they must obey agency policies and
general conceptions of impartial adjudication. Their refusal to do so would be relevant to any
removal decision.
325. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (empowering agencies to appoint as many ALJs as necessary); see
also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (considering Special Division’s inability to name
independent counsel without AG’s request when approving of interbranch appointment of
independent counsel).
326. See supra Part IV.A (outlining the agency’s participation in selecting ALJs under this
proposal).
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experience.327 Agencies may also seek the nearly immediate removal of
an ALJ, on a “fast track,” if the agency can establish “inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance.”328 And agencies can immediately
remove an ALJ who presents a national-security risk.329 Such abilities
provide ample agency supervision over ALJs and the smooth
functioning of the executive branch.
The transferred removal power from the executive branch to
the D.C. Circuit—and thus the limited sharing of ALJ supervision
between the two branches—should not trouble the executive branch
because it has, as a practical matter, lost nothing. Its removal powers
were already substantially limited. Currently, agencies cannot simply
remove an ALJ. Instead, they must persuade an independent agency
(the MSPB) to remove an ALJ.330 Likewise, under my proposal, the
agency must continue to persuade an independent entity to remove an
ALJ. Under both the current and the proposed removal schemes, the
President and the agency lack the ability to decide the removal
question and the ability to influence the MSPB’s or the D.C. Circuit’s
decision directly because of each body’s protection from removal.331
Both scenarios also provide ALJs a judicial forum. Although the
current scenario provides deferential judicial review of the MSPB’s
decision in the Federal Circuit,332 my proposal permits the agency to
have speedier resolution of removal disputes because the D.C. Circuit
decides the issue in the first instance. Moreover, even if the ALJs, as
the lower-level officers in their tiered-tenure scheme, lost their tenure
protection under a Free Enterprise Fund analysis,333 the MSPB would
continue to have substantial tenure protection that would prevent
direct presidential interference with the MSPB’s decision. At bottom,
327. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining the “Veteran’s Preference” in ALJ
qualification and related expertise problems under the current system).
328. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (explaining the standard of removal for
ALJs); infra note 337 and accompanying text (same).
329. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (explaining immediate removal option).
330. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (establishing that removal of an ALJ is permissible “only for good
cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board”); id. § 1202(d)
(shielding members of the MSPB from the President’s at-will removal).
331. Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3171 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(discussing the analogous inability of the President to remove members of the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board directly where the removal decision was vested in SEC
commissioners who were themselves removable only for cause).
332. See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 387 nn.33 & 35 (1983) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7703)
(highlighting that “the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive
jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB”).
333. Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (declaring unconstitutional the two tiers of tenure
protection for PCAOB members).
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agencies would simply petition a different, albeit perhaps more,
independent body under my proposal.
But at the same time, the proposed tenure-protection standard
for ALJs seeks to strike the proper balance between ALJ impartiality
and executive supervision. Although Congress intended to ensure ALJ
impartiality with good cause tenure protection,334 the good cause
standard has consistently been interpreted to permit removal of other
federal officials based on insubordination.335 Such a standard
suggests, contrary to congressional intent, that ALJs are required to
follow agency heads’ direction on how to decide matters. Were it
otherwise, the term “insubordination” would assume a different
meaning for ALJs than for other federal officials, without any textual
support for the distinction.336 The proposed “inefficiency, neglect of
duty, and malfeasance” standard—the ubiquitous protection for
federal adjudicators337—provides more specific grounds for removal
than the good cause standard and thereby further constrains the
removing party’s discretion.338 This proposed standard would not
permit removal based on insubordination.339 But, happily for the
executive branch, it makes clear that inefficiency is a proper ground
for removal that, with proper judicial interpretation, should permit
removal based on, say, an unjustified low number of decided cases (as

334. See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131–32, 142 (1953)
(“Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are employed only for good cause
established and determined by the Civil Service Commission (hereinafter called the Commission)
after opportunity for hearing and upon the record thereof.”).
335. See Nagel v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 707 F.2d 1384, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(citing Boyle v. United States, 515 F.2d 1397, 1402 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Burton v. United States, 404
F.2d 365 (Ct. Cl. 1968)); see also May v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 230 F. Supp. 659, 661 (W.D. La.
1963).
336. See Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321, 330–31 & n.11 (1984) (suggesting
that insubordination was a proper ground for removal of ALJs, but also suggesting that removal
based on substantive decisions was improper); Barnett, supra note 117, at 1397–98 n.231.
Perhaps an ALJ is charged with being impartial and thus cannot be insubordinate for failing to
defer to the agency’s wishes. But even so, the vague good cause standard provides the agency
much discretion in finding other more palatable, if insincere, grounds for removal.
337. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (MSPB members); 10 U.S.C. § 942(c) (2006) (similar
standard for judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces); 26 U.S.C. § 7443(f)
(2006) (similar standard for tax-court judges); 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006) (similar standard for
bankruptcy judges); 28 U.S.C. § 631 (similar standard for magistrate judges).
338. See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1373–82 (arguing that “good faith” standard is more
open-ended than other removal standards and thus provides the removing party more discretion
to decide appropriate grounds for removal); see also Timony, supra note 2, at 821 (referring to
judicial interpretation of good cause as “broad and expanding”).
339. See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1373–82.
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compared to other ALJs).340 Whatever minimal supervisory power the
agency loses under the proposed removal standard as a practical
matter, the proposed standard mitigates impartiality concerns that
could arise under a broad reading of good cause,341 provides more
specific grounds for removal,342 treats ALJs like other federal
adjudicators (both those within and without Article III), and makes
clear that agencies may seek removal based on an ALJ’s unjustified
inability to control his or her docket (i.e., inefficiency).343
The complete transfer of removal power from the executive to
the judicial branch may give one pause. After all, the Supreme Court
in Morrison was not only troubled by the Special Division’s limited
ability to terminate the independent counsel, but the Court also relied
upon the Attorney General’s limited ability to remove the independent
counsel when upholding the interbranch appointment of the
independent counsel.344 And perhaps the executive branch’s need for
the removal power is at its apex when the executive branch does not
appoint the officer in question. Under the proposal here, the executive
branch’s removal power is fully removed, and the judiciary has a more
robust removal power than in Morrison.
But, in the ALJ context, the problems themselves provide the
solutions. As previously discussed, an interbranch-appointment-andremoval power cures the supervision and impartiality concerns in a
manner that executive-branch removal would flout. In other contexts,
the concerns that Congress sought to address did not require the
transfer of the removal power. For instance, the interbranch
appointment of the independent counsel mitigated an intrabranch

340. See generally Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989) (approving, in an ambiguous
opinion, controversial productivity initiative for ALJs within the SSA). Professor Richard Pierce
has opined that the productivity standard became toothless based on MSPB decisions and
reconsideration within the SSA. See Richard Pierce, What Should We Do About Administrative
Law Judge Decisionmaking? 15–16 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law Research
Paper No. 573, 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1890770.
341. See Timony, supra note 2, at 822 (“Such broad and amorphous standards may impinge
on judicial independence . . . .”).
342. See id. at 824 (advocating use of clearer removal standard).
343. See id. at 826–28 (discussing removal based on low productivity).
344. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682–83 (1988); id. at 692 (“This is not a case in
which the power to remove an executive official has been completely stripped from the President,
thus providing no means for the President to ensure the ‘faithful execution’ of the laws.”); id. at
695–96 (discussing the ways in which the Attorney General could supervise the Independent
Counsel, including limited, “for cause” removal power). Moreover, the majority in Free Enterprise
Fund suggested that the President’s removal power was central to the President’s supervisory
power. See Krent, supra note 282, at 2426, 2437 (“But, to the majority, the removal authority
was talismanic . . . .”).
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conflict of interest in having someone appointed to investigate the
executive branch itself, and the interbranch appointment of U.S.
Attorneys provides a last-ditch solution to ensure prosecutorial
continuity while the elected branches fight over a successor. But with
ALJs, the transfer of the removal power is part of the solution.
This problem-as-solution rationale would likely be insufficient
to justify the transfer of the removal power if it were not also for ALJs’
unique role within the executive branch. As previously mentioned, the
underlying rationale of Free Enterprise Fund’s focus on the removal
power was that the President should not be required to persuade
executive officers. But ALJs exist to be persuaded. The executive
branch does not need the power to remove ALJs, as opposed to other
executive inferior officials who could make policy decisions, to protect
its political prerogative. In short, the removal power is not always a
necessary means of supervision. Moreover, the President’s ability to
overturn ALJ decisions and seek an ALJ’s removal quickly permits
him or her to have sufficient supervisory power to ensure the central
functioning of the executive branch. Indeed, the lack of executivebranch removal power gives ALJs and the administrative bureaucracy
within the executive branch an increased perception of impartiality
and thus more public legitimacy. The removal power’s “talismanic”
quality345 loses its mythical force in a purely adjudicatory context,
where other methods of supervision can and should suffice. The
executive branch, in other words, may completely lose the power to
remove ALJs, but it still has significant methods of supervising and
directing them.346
Finally, because the President should be deemed to have
sufficient supervisory power over ALJs, the D.C. Circuit’s power to
remove them should not transform ALJs into inferior Article III
officers. Under my proposal, the executive branch and the D.C.
Circuit, to be sure, share oversight of ALJs—the former through
supervision of policy and the latter through its limited removal power.
But ALJs, as between the executive and judicial branches, fit better
within the executive branch because they help formulate executive

345. See Krent, supra note 282, at 2437; see also supra note 289 (referring to scholarship
arguing that courts should focus on other indicia of administrative independence and executive
control).
346. To be sure, the Supreme Court may take a more formal view of supervision by
requiring, as the form of supervision, that the President have the power to remove subordinates.
If so, my proposal would likely impede the President’s supervisory powers, and the quandary
would remain unresolved. A more functional understanding of supervision is likely necessary,
and not inconsistent with current precedent, to resolve the quandary surrounding ALJs.
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policy through their initial decisions, and the executive branch can
control that policy by reversing those decisions. The judiciary’s
oversight is limited to removing ALJs for narrow causes upon others’
requests, including that of the executive branch. Indeed, as the Article
III courts’ removal power over bankruptcy judges suggests,347 the
judiciary’s power to remove an officer should not, by itself, render that
officer as one within Article III. In short, the D.C. Circuit’s limited
removal power as a form of ALJ oversight does not, without more,
render ALJs Article III officers, in light of ALJs’ function and greater
oversight from the executive branch.
As the Court recognized in Mistretta when quoting James
Madison:
‘Separation of powers . . . ‘d[oes] not mean that these [three] departments ought to have
no partial agency in, or no controul over the acts of each other,’ but rather ‘that where
the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the
whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution,
are subverted.’348

Vesting the power to appoint and remove ALJs in an Article III court
falls far short of vesting the whole executive power in the judiciary
because the judiciary has no policymaking power whatsoever. The
executive branch has the ability to make policy at every turn and
continue “to take Care that the Laws are faithfully executed.”349 Here,
as elsewhere, “constitutional principles of separated powers are not
violated . . . by mere anomaly or innovation.”350

347. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2627 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 2619
(holding that bankruptcy courts are not adjuncts of Article III courts).
348. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380–81 (1989) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO.
47, at 325–26 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis in original)). Indeed, even Justice
Scalia may agree in the context of an interbranch appointment. The lone dissenter in Mistretta
(and Morrison), Justice Scalia chided the majority for citing Madison for the point that the
boundaries between the three branches were porous. He argued instead that
[Madison’s] point was that the commingling specifically provided for in the structure
that he and his colleagues had designed—the Presidential veto over legislation, the
Senate’s confirmation of executive and judicial officers, the Senate’s ratification of
treaties, the Congress’s power to impeach and remove executive and judicial officers—
did not violate a proper understanding of separation of powers.
Id. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The text of the Appointments Clause permits such
“commingling” through interbranch appointments and thus may be acceptable even to Justice
Scalia.
349. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
350. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385 (majority opinion). But see Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v.
Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1641 (2011) (stating that lack of historical pedigree can indicate
constitutional infirmity); accord Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997).
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CONCLUSION
An interbranch appointment of ALJs is overdue. Five current
Supreme Court Justices (two of whom are eminent administrative law
scholars) have suggested that certain ALJs are not appointed
properly. Four Justices have suggested that ALJs’ tiered-tenure
protections may be invalidated in future litigation. And ALJ
impartiality is a continued topic of discomfort for scholars, litigants,
and ALJs. Because of administrative uncertainty and distraction
arising from the mere presence of those issues, Congress should not
await judicial resolution of these troubling issues. Indeed, Congress
has remedied past separation-of-powers problems without waiting for
a definitive answer.351 Moreover, even if ALJs are not constitutionally
infirm, they are not necessarily in excellent health. An interbranch
appointment, along with relatively minor statutory changes to the
ALJ appointment and removal scheme, can both mitigate potential
constitutional questions and ameliorate the current concerns about
ALJ impartiality.
Key constituencies, such as federal agencies, have good reasons
to support my proposal. For instance, despite losing the ability to
select ALJs under my proposal, agencies would gain a way around the
Rule of Three by obtaining the ability to nominate their own
candidates if they are unsatisfied with the three original candidates.
Because it is likely that the D.C. Circuit, in interests of comity, will
carefully consider the agencies’ views and proffered candidates, the
agencies may actually prefer to exchange the power to select for the
power to nominate. The agencies would also retain the power to seek
removal of ALJs. Under either the current or proposed scheme, they
must convince an independent body to remove ALJs. And, to mollify
their expressed concerns over the protracted nature of ALJ-removal
proceedings, agencies would receive swifter resolution of ALJ-removal
proceedings because of the direct filing of an action with the D.C.
Circuit.352
351. After Professor John Duffy noted that the appointment of certain administrative judges
for the Board of Patent Appeals was very likely unconstitutional, Congress altered those judges’
mode of appointment without awaiting a judicial determination concerning those appointments.
See John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
904, 904 n.*, 918 n.72 (2009) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2006) (as amended Aug. 2008)).
352. Given agencies’ reduced control over ALJs, as compared to other agency employees,
agencies have turned to rulemaking and non-ALJ hearing officers when possible. See Wertkin,
supra note 288, at 397–99, n.157 (citing Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for
Uniformity Faltering?, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 70 (1996) (stating that non-ALJs are “sprouting
faster than tulips in Holland”)). Because agencies are in essentially the same, if not an improved,
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Likewise, ALJs should support an interbranch-appointment
solution. Despite failing to obtain Article III protections and status,
they do receive clarified tenure protection that is suited to their
adjudicative function, and they obtain more perceived and actual
indicia of independence. An independent branch’s appointment and
removal of ALJs should help balance the ALJs’ pro-agency bias that is
said to develop and help link the administrative adjudicators with
their deified judicial counterparts. No longer will a party to formal
agency proceedings be the appointing and removing power.
Even the D.C. Circuit judges have reason to support the
interbranch-appointment proposal. The D.C. Circuit has not been fully
staffed in more than a decade, in part because of the general
perception that the court is not sufficiently busy to require the number
of active judges that the court is permitted to have353 and because of
the politicization of appointments to the “second most important
court” in the country, from which several recent Supreme Court
Justices have been elevated.354 Vesting the appointment and removal
power in the D.C. Circuit may mitigate both concerns. Proponents of
having a full complement of D.C. Circuit judges could point to the
court’s increased duties to compensate for its low number of decisions.
And they could point to the court’s administrative role in protecting
formal executive adjudication—by selecting neutral adjudicators355—
as a means of emphasizing the court’s important and necessary place
in the judiciary and the administrative state, and de-emphasizing the
court’s unofficial status as a junior-varsity Supreme Court.
More broadly, my proposal demonstrates the potential for
interbranch appointments to solve structural concerns with the
modern administrative state. The clarified and simplified incongruity
analysis that I have proposed is consistent with interbranchappointment jurisprudence and perhaps may render interbranch
appointment a helpful tool for Congress to remedy as-of-yet
unidentified, future separation-of-powers conundrums. Congress,
thereby, can improve the fairness, both actual and perceived, in the
governing structures that it creates.
position under my proposal as they are currently, an interbranch appointment will likely not
alter the agencies’ turning away from ALJs. The issue, instead, concerns when Congress should
require formal adjudication under the APA.
353. See Bloch & Ginsburg, supra note 223, at 562 n.63 (discussing Congress’s questioning
of whether the D.C. Circuit was sufficiently busy to require twelve judges).
354. Carl Tobias, The Urgent Need to Fill The Current D.C. Circuit Vacancies, JUSTICA.COM
(Nov. 14, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/11/14/the-urgent-need-to-fill-the-current-d-ccircuit-vacancies.
355. See supra Part IV.C.2.
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***
In closing, one final series of questions emerges: Should
scholars, including me, bother considering solutions for these mostly
formalist problems, largely arising from questionable Supreme Court
precedent? For instance, does it really matter, as a functional matter,
who appoints ALJs, when these ALJs may have lunch or chat around
the water cooler with other employees within the agency, or when the
agency can generally overrule all ALJ decisions anyway? Or, for
example, should we concern ourselves with a removal-power doctrine
that appears to invalidate tiered-tenure protection although one tier of
tenure protection can substantially limit the President’s control over
the administrative state? Similarly, should we worry about
independence and impartiality issues that are largely grounded on
appearances of impropriety and perhaps merely theoretical effects of
an agency’s appointment and initiation of removal? Indeed, should we
address the Court’s current formalist separation-of-powers doctrines
at all in light of its historical fluctuation between formalism and
functionalism?
In short, the answer to these questions—all of which, at
bottom, ask whether current doctrine that largely eschews
functionalism for formalism should matter to normative reforms—is
yes. Separation-of-powers scholars often seek to reshape or reconsider
separation of powers.356 Although such work has its place, the purpose
of this Article is to move beyond the mere normative issues and
instead define the problems and answers within the doctrinal
construct that the Court has provided. Doctrine, for better or worse,
matters for practicing lawyers and judges, and I seek to persuade
scholars, practitioners, and Congress that my statutory solution is a
serious option to consider in resolving a multifaceted problem.
Formalities can often matter both substantively and
practically. For instance, the Court has repeatedly held that the
vesting of the appointment power is not mere “etiquette or protocol.”357
Instead, the appointing formalities are express, specific requirements
in the Constitution meant to act as a bulwark for democratic
government.358 But formalism, as with the Court’s removal-powers
jurisprudence can potentially have significant, disruptive effects on

356. See Barkow, supra note 289, at 16 n.2 (referring to the “vast literature” on separation of
powers and agency independence).
357. See, e.g., Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)).
358. Id.

2b. Barnett_PAGE (Do Not Delete)

864

4/23/2013 4:41 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:3:797

the federal administrative state.359 The proposed solution here
respects the substantive underpinnings, as well as limits the
disruptive effects, of the Court’s formalist doctrines.
Whether one supports or disfavors the Court’s formalism
normatively, one cannot simply ignore the doctrine or wish for its
demise. The Court has taken a decidedly formalist turn in its
separation-of-powers jurisprudence for nearly twenty-five years. For
instance, the Court has relied upon a more formal definition of
“inferior officer,”360 settled upon a new two-part definition of
“department,”361 eschewed a functional understanding of the
President’s removal powers that four dissenting Justices would have
adopted,362 and likely returned to more formal limits on removing
disputes from Article III courts.363 In light of these decisions and the
lack of functional counterexamples since 1988’s Morrison v. Olson, the
Court’s formal doctrines are not a mere fad, but instead a conscious
jurisprudential turn that scholars ignore at their peril. These formal
doctrines create, in part, the tripartite quandary that I discuss here,
and a solution becomes difficult because functional concerns lose much
of their salience. One must, therefore, confront the doctrine on its own
terms, seek a formal solution to a largely formal problem, and—in the
process—seek to suggest ways to soften the edges or unintended
consequences of the formalist doctrine with permissible functional
considerations. Here, I have proposed a formal interbranchappointment-and-removal mechanism that seeks to address the
formal problems of executive adjudication and account for some
functional avenues where the Court’s decisions permit.
Finally, statutory proposals, such as the one that I have
proposed here that seeks to dull the edges of the Court’s formalism,
reduce the real possibility of the Court creating even more uncertainty
in the law to account for the problems that its formal doctrines create.
The Court’s separation-of-powers doctrines are notoriously hard to
reconcile, often lacking any theoretical consistency.364 The Court may
be tempted to decide cases in ways that avoid disruptive outcomes at
the expense of whatever doctrinal coherence exists. My statutory
359. See generally Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3177–82 (2010) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the potential consequences of the Court’s ruling on the double for-cause
removal clause at issue).
360. See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–64 (1997).
361. See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163.
362. See id. at 3167–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
363. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09, 2620 (2011).
364. See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1350.
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solution is meant to avoid such decisions. Perhaps paradoxically, the
Court’s formal, inconsistent doctrines may have ultimately provided
an impetus for solving both formal and functional problems that have
long plagued formal administrative adjudication. And this solution
may, as a consequence, give ALJs some of the deification that they
have long craved.

